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CRIMINAL LAW/CRIMINOLOGY 
UNMARKED? CRIMINAL RECORD 
CLEARING AND EMPLOYMENT 
OUTCOMES 
JEFFREY SELBIN 
 JUSTIN MCCRARY 
 JOSHUA EPSTEIN* 	  
An estimated one in three American adults has a criminal record.  While 
some records are for serious offenses, most are for arrests or relatively low-
level misdemeanors.  In an era of heightened security concerns, easily 
available data, and increased criminal background checks, these records act 
as a substantial barrier to gainful employment and other opportunities.  
Harvard sociologist Devah Pager describes people with criminal records as 
“marked” with a negative job credential. 
In response to this problem, lawyers have launched unmarking  
programs to help people take advantage of legal record clearing remedies.  
We studied a random sample of participants in one such program to analyze 
the impact of the record clearing intervention on employment outcomes.   
Using methods to control for selection bias and the effects of changes in the 
economy in our data, we found evidence that: (1) the record clearing  
intervention boosted participants’ employment rates and average real  
earnings, and (2) people sought record clearing remedies after a period of  
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suppressed earnings. 
More research needs to be done to understand the durability of the 
positive impact and its effects in different local settings and labor markets, 
but these findings suggest that the record clearing intervention makes a 
meaningful difference in employment outcomes for people with criminal 
records.  The findings also suggest the importance of early intervention to  
increase employment opportunities for people with criminal records.  Such 
interventions might include more legal services, but they might also include 
record clearing by operation of law or another mechanism that does not put 
the onus of unmarking on the person with a criminal record. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States has the highest rate of incarceration in the developed 
world.1  Almost seven million Americans are in prison or under correctional 
supervision.2  People of color in general and African-Americans in particular 
are grossly overrepresented in the prison population.3  Mass incarceration is 
widely viewed as discriminatory, costly, and inhumane, and facilitating the 
reentry of people released from prison has become a bipartisan concern.4 
Mass incarceration and reentry, however, are only the tip of the criminal 
justice iceberg, obscuring the underlying and broader phenomenon of mass 
criminalization.5  The FBI reports that almost 74 million people, or nearly 
 
1  ROY WALMSLEY, INST. FOR CRIMINAL POLICY RESEARCH, WORLD PRISON POPULATION 
LIST 2 (11th ed. 2016) (finding that the prison population rate in the United States at the end 
of 2015—698 per 100,000—was lower only than that of the East African archipelago of 
Seychelles).  
2  Danielle Kaeble et al., CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014, at 1 
(2016), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus14.pdf. 
3  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2014, at 1 
(2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14_Summary.pdf (“Black men had the highest 
imprisonment rate in every age group and were in state or federal facilities 3.8 to 10.5 times 
more often than white men and 1.4 to 3.1 times more often than Hispanic men . . . [B]lack 
females were between 1.6 and 4.1 times more likely to be imprisoned than white females 
across all age groups.”).  
4  See, e.g., Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) 
(signed by President Obama to reduce the racially-driven disparity in the sentencing of crack 
and cocaine related offenses); Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–199, 122 Stat. 
657 (2007) (signed by President Bush to provide grants to organizations facilitating prison 
reentry); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 4–5 (2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2013/ 
08/12/smart-on-crime.pdf (recommending reform of the criminal justice system through 
conservation of prosecutorial and law enforcement resources for the most serious crimes, 
sentencing reform, alternatives to incarceration, and support of reentry initiatives to reduce 
recidivism).  But see Perry Bacon, Jr., Are Bipartisan Efforts on Criminal Justice Reform at 
an Impasse?, NBC NEWS (June 6, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/are-
bipartisan-efforts-criminal-justice-reform-impasse-n584921 (arguing that bipartisan criminal 
justice reform efforts have stalled). The mass incarceration phenomenon was popularized with 
the publication of MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010). 
5  Mass criminalization has received renewed attention recently.  See Alexandra Natapoff, 
Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1056–69 (2015) (noting that, while 
many jurisdictions are shortening drug sentences and closing prisons, people convicted of 
nonjailable misdemeanors still often face more discrete punitive measures such as probation, 
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one-third of American adults, have a criminal record, mostly for arrests not 
leading to a conviction and misdemeanors.6  Evidence suggests that by the 
age of twenty-three, almost one-half of all African-American and Latino 
men, more than one-third of white men, and almost one in eight women have 
been arrested.7 
Maintained in court files or as records of arrests and prosecutions (“RAP 
sheets”) in state and federal repositories, criminal records create collateral 
consequences that often serve as lifelong obstacles to a range of benefits and 
opportunities.8  Harvard sociologist Devah Pager and others have  
documented the particularly harmful effect of criminal records on  
employment outcomes.9  Although the specific labor market effects vary 
across demographic groups and by sectors of the economy, people with 
criminal records of any kind experience lower employment rates and earnings 
than people without such records. According to Pager, criminal records 
“mark” their owners with a negative job credential.10 
Because criminal records can exist indefinitely, employment barriers 
 
fines, criminal records, and collateral consequences); Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s 
Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 321, 325 (2015). But overcriminalization 
and its harmful effects are not new concepts and concerns.  See Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis 
of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 157, 157 (1967) (arguing 
that “[t]he use of criminal law to enforce morals, to provide social services, and to avoid legal 
restraints on law enforcement, to take just three examples, has tended both to be inefficient 
and to produce grave handicaps for enforcement of the criminal law against genuinely 
threatening conduct.”); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 
703, 712 (2005) (describing overcriminalization as a socio-political phenomenon).  
6  FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION MONTHLY FACT 
SHEET, AUGUST 2017 MONTHLY STATISTICS (2017), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ngi-
monthly-fact-sheet/view (showing that, as of the date of the fact sheet, there were 73, 796, 661 
unique criminal records in the database). 
7  Robert Brame et al., Demographic Patterns of Cumulative Arrest Prevalence by Ages 
18 and 23, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 471, 476 (2014). 
8  See generally Sarah B. Berson, Beyond the Sentence – Understanding Collateral 
Consequences, 272 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 25 (Sept. 2013), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ 
241927.pdf.  
9  See, e.g., DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS 
INCARCERATION 17 (2007); Harry J. Holzer et al., The Effect of an Applicant’s Criminal 
History on Employer Hiring Decisions on Screening Practices: Evidence from Los Angeles, 
in BARRIERS TO REENTRY?: THE LABOR MARKET FOR RELEASED PRISONERS IN POST-
INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 117, 122 (Shawn Bushway et al. eds., 2007); Jenny Roberts, Why 
Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 277, 299–300 (2011).  
10  Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 942 (2003). Pager’s 
audit study also found striking disparities in treatment by race.  African-Americans with and 
without criminal records fared much worse in receiving employment callbacks than their white 
counterparts.  “In fact, even whites with criminal records received more favorable treatment 
(17%) than blacks without criminal records (14%).”  Id. at 958. 
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can last a lifetime. NYU law professor James Jacobs calls this phenomenon 
“the eternal criminal record.”11  Further, public access to such records is a 
uniquely American phenomenon. European countries maintain criminal  
records, but court files and data in official public repositories are treated as 
highly personal. Criminal records can only be released to the person with the 
record, or to the police, prosecutors, or judges, and under limited 
circumstances.12  The United States is even more exceptional in making arrest  
records publicly available.13 
Policymakers have responded to the durability and accessibility of  
criminal records with strategies to reduce their collateral consequences,  
especially their negative impact on employment outcomes. States are  
updating and expanding a variety of record clearing remedies that mostly 
predate the modern era in which such records have become ubiquitous and 
consequential.14  Some jurisdictions have begun to limit the use of criminal 
records by employers in the hiring process.  Though employers may still  
conduct criminal background checks toward the end of the hiring process, so-
called “ban-the-box” policies typically forbid employers from asking about 
criminal history in the early stages, including on the job application and  
during initial interviews.15 
 
11  JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 4 (2015). 
12  Id. at 159; see also James Jacobs & Dimitra Blitsa, Sharing Criminal Records: The 
United States, the European Union and Interpol Compared, 30 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 125, 142–43 (2008) (explaining that European prison and probation services, along with 
customs offices, will often have access to criminal record information and that some European 
Union countries require the person with a criminal record to provide a reason for requesting 
access to it—e.g., a desire to obtain a hunting permit or verify the accuracy of what is in the 
record). 
13  See Jacobs & Blitsa, supra note 12, at 160, 194–208 (noting that no other country makes 
such records available and that the U.S. approach “is dictated by the First Amendment and by 
constitutional, political, and cultural commitment to governmental, especially judicial, 
transparency”). 
14  RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., RELIEF IN SIGHT? STATES RETHINK THE 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION, 2009–2014, at 23 (2014), 
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/states-rethink-collateral-
consequences-report-v3.pdf (describing how twenty-two states and the District of Columbia 
enacted such laws between 2009 and 2014). 
15  See NATHAN JAMES, OFFENDER REENTRY: CORRECTIONAL STATISTICS, REINTEGRATION 
INTO THE COMMUNITY, AND RECIDIVISM 18 (Jan. 12, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
RL34287.pdf (describing federal efforts to incentivize hiring of people with records, which 
include the Work Opportunity Tax Credits Program and the Federal Bonding Program); BETH 
AVERY & PHIL HERNANDEZ, NAT’L EMP. LAW PROJECT, BAN THE BOX: U.S. CITIES, COUNTIES, 
AND STATES ADOPT FAIR-CHANCE HIRING POLICIES TO ADVANCE EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEOPLE WITH PAST CONVICTIONS 1 (Aug. 2017), 
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide.pdf. 
The federal government and several state governments, including California, now offer tax 
breaks to companies that hire people with criminal records. See, e.g., Cal. Rev. & Tax. 
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Lawyers have responded to the criminal records problem by establishing 
programs to help people obtain record clearing remedies.16  Such remedies 
are generally available to people with records of arrests or relatively minor 
infractions, misdemeanors, and low-level felonies.17  The goal of record 
clearing programs is to provide clients with a “clean slate” when seeking 
 employment, licensing, promotions, and other opportunities.18  The promise 
of the record clearing intervention is that it will help people with criminal  
records gain access to more and better jobs, which in turn will reduce social 
and economic hardship for individuals, families, and society. 
While it is clear that people with criminal records face significant labor 
market barriers, we are just beginning to understand if, how, and for whom 
interventions such as ban-the-box policies and criminal record clearing  
improve employment outcomes.  In fact, recent evidence suggests that the 
impact of ban-the-box policies may be mixed.  In the absence of screening 
job applicants based on criminal records, researchers have found that  
employers may engage in so-called “statistical discrimination,” disfavoring 
minority job applicants relative to white applicants.19  These findings remind 
us that interventions can have uncertain and unintended consequences.20 
 
Code § 17053.34 (2012) (providing that a qualifying employer who hires a person with a 
criminal record may claim a tax credit).  
16  See infra Section II.  
17  See Margaret Love, Restrictions on Access to Criminal Records: A National Survey, 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CTR., (Mar. 9, 2017), http://ccresourcecenter.org/ 
2017/03/09/restrictions-on-access-to-criminal-records-a-national-survey/ (providing an 
overview of record clearing remedies nationwide). 
18  REBECCA VALLAS & SHARON DIETRICH, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, ONE STRIKE AND 
YOU’RE OUT: HOW WE CAN ELIMINATE BARRIERS TO ECONOMIC SECURITY AND MOBILITY FOR 
PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 34 (Dec. 2014), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/VallasCriminalRecordsReport.pdf. 
19  See generally Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and 
Statistical Discrimination: A Field Experiment, MICH. L. & ECON. RES. PAPER SERIES (2016), 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2795795 (a study of 
employment callback rates in New York and New Jersey before and after enactment of ban-
the-box policies; while such rates did increase for African-American applicants after 
enactment, they increased at a higher rate for white applicants, suggesting employers were 
discriminating against African-American applicants in the absence of being able to use 
criminal records as a screening mechanism); Jennifer L. Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, Does 
“Ban the Box” Help or Hurt Low-Skilled Workers? Statistical Discrimination and 
Employment Outcomes When Criminal Histories Are Hidden (Jan. 2017), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2812811 (finding that ban-the-box policies decrease the probability 
of being employed by 5.1% for young, low-skilled African-American men, and by 2.9% for 
young, low-skilled Hispanic men, supporting the hypothesis that employers statistically 
discriminate against certain demographic groups when applicants’ criminal history is 
unavailable). 
20  The authors of a leading ban-the-box study acknowledge that their research does not 
necessarily answer questions about the effect of the intervention on actual employment 
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Lawyers have developed criminal record clearing programs under the 
assumption that unmarking reduces barriers to employment for people with 
criminal records, but we actually know very little about the relationship  
between record clearing and employment outcomes.21  It is unlikely that  
employers make hiring decisions based solely on the presence of a criminal 
record, independent of other considerations. In addition, a criminal record 
may interact simultaneously or synergistically with a host of other  
characteristics that can impact employment opportunities and outcomes, such 
as race, education, and work history.22 
To begin to answer whether the record clearing intervention improves 
employment outcomes for people with criminal records, we conducted a  
retrospective timeframe study of a random sample of several hundred clients 
who received legal assistance from the East Bay Community Law Center’s 
Clean Slate Clinic in Alameda County (Oakland), California. We gathered 
and analyzed clients’ employment rates and average real earnings reported to 
the Social Security Administration before and after assistance by the clinic.  
By doing this with four cohorts of clients over time, we in effect created 
treatment groups (those who received the record clearing intervention) and 
control groups (those who had yet to receive the intervention), which allows 
us to say something meaningful about employment outcomes related to the 
intervention. 
 
outcomes. See Agan & Starr, supra note 19, at 32. Their research focuses on initial employer 
responses in scheduling callbacks, not on applicants getting a job. Id. The National 
Employment Law Project and other ban-the-box advocates have criticized those who invoke 
the findings of the Agan and Starr study to call for the repeal of ban-the-box. Id.  See also 
BETH AVERY & MAURICE EMSELLEM, THE NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, RACIAL PROFILING IN 
HIRING: A CRITIQUE OF NEW “BAN THE BOX” STUDIES (Aug. 11, 2016), available at 
http://www.nelp.org/publication/racial-profiling-in-hiring-a-critique-of-new-ban-the-box-
studies (arguing that the central problem illuminated by critiques of the ban-the-box policy is 
not the policy itself but the tendency to associate blackness with criminality in the hiring 
process and arguing further that ban-the-box is working by increasing employment 
opportunities for people with records while changing the attitudes of employers). 
21  Our study is part of a nascent empirical literature assessing the relationship between 
record clearing and employment outcomes.  The closest analog we are aware of is Charles E. 
Loeffler et al., Estimating the Labor Market Effects of the Criminal Record Expungement and 
Sealing (Nov. 2015) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors) (examining a large 
cohort of clients screened by a legal aid office and comparing eligible and ineligible applicants 
to identify a short-term improvement in employment probabilities based on statewide 
Unemployment Insurance wage data).  We are aware of at least two record clearing programs 
that have undergone quantitative evaluations.  See infra note 182. 
22  In the ban-the-box context, as noted above, recent studies have demonstrated the 
relationship between employment strategies and racial discrimination.  See supra notes 19 and 
20 and accompanying text.  One research team found, however, that education (a GED) and 
employment history (job gap) did not have a significant impact on job callbacks.  See Agan & 
Starr, supra note 19, at 28. 
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While there are limits to our data and method, we can report at least two 
important findings about the relationship between the record clearing 
intervention and employment outcomes: 
First, the record clearing intervention appeared to boost both average 
employment rates and average earnings.  Average employment rates grew in 
the years after the intervention from roughly 75% to 80%-85%.  For reasons 
that are not clear, employment rates declined slightly three years after the 
intervention, though they were still above baseline rates.  Average real 
earnings increased slightly during the first year of the intervention and rose 
rapidly thereafter—within three years of participation, earnings grew from 
$4,000 below baseline to nearly $2,000 above baseline, a significant  
magnitude ($6,000) equal to roughly one-third of total average earnings. 
Second, participants sought the record clearing remedy after a period of 
suppressed earnings, in spite of relatively active and stable employment 
rates.23  Their formal incomes were very low from the outset, averaging less 
than 40% of earnings among local residents.  In the wake of the early 2000s 
recession, participants’ average annual earnings fell from roughly $20,000 to 
$18,000.24  Average earnings increased to over $22,000 leading up to the 
great recession but plummeted to just over $14,000 in 2009.  This precipitous 
drop during the great recession was much more rapid and sharp for those with 
criminal records than for all local residents, likely as a result of the fragile 
labor market for people with criminal records.  When controlling for other 
factors, participants’ average real earnings are about 20 percent ($4,000)  
below their baseline earnings ($18,000) prior to seeking record clearing. 
Such evidence supports arguments for expanding the availability of the 
intervention.  The record clearing intervention might be even more impactful 
if it were available sooner to help prevent declining earnings and more  
effective if it were available by operation of law or another mechanism that 
did not put the burden of unmarking on the person with a criminal record.  
These relatively simple approaches—more programs, earlier intervention, 
and automatic clearing—could increase the number of people availing  
themselves of remedies that reduce the negative employment consequences 
of criminal records. 
In Part I of this Article, we describe the criminal records problem in the 
United States, where tens of millions of people have relatively minor records 
that serve as a barrier to employment and other opportunities.  In Part II, we 
describe the record clearing intervention, which is designed to overcome the 
barriers described in Part I. In Part III, we profile the East Bay Community 
 
23  This phenomenon is consistent with the literature on job training programs, which we 
discuss in more detail below.  See infra note 248 and accompanying text.  
24  All figures are in 2015 dollars. 
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Law Center’s Clean Slate Clinic, a record clearing program that served as the 
site of inquiry for this study.  In Part IV, we explain our study methods to 
measure the impact of the record clearing intervention on employment  
outcomes.  In Part V, we detail our findings and consider their implications 
for policy and research. 
I. MARKING: THE CRIMINAL RECORDS PROBLEM 
The criminal records problem in the United States is the product of  
several converging trends in recent decades.  Federal and state policies fueled 
a dramatic increase in civilian encounters with law enforcement, which  
disproportionately impacted communities of color.25  Records of these  
encounters have become easily accessible due to the vast information-sharing 
infrastructure made possible by the internet and facilitated by permissive 
state and federal laws. Further, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and ensuing security 
fears increased the demand for publicly available criminal records.26 
Although criminal records take many forms, our study is concerned  
primarily with those maintained in courthouses, which form the basis for 
RAP sheets stored in state and federal repositories.27  Easy access to such 
criminal record information is a uniquely American phenomenon that enables 
discrimination and imposes hardship on people with criminal records in  
almost every sector of society.28  Barriers to employment for people with 
criminal records are particularly high, as background checks have become a 
routine and often dispositive feature of the job application process.29  These 
obstacles serve as an ongoing form of punishment for people with criminal 
records. 
In this Part, we explore the factors that contributed to the criminal  
records problem, the collateral consequences of criminal records, and the  
special employment challenges facing people with criminal records. 
A. MASS CRIMINALIZATION AND RECORDS 
Since the mid-1960s, tens of millions of people have been arrested and 
 
25  See JACOBS, supra note 11, at 2 (explaining that the war on drugs and adoption of zero 
tolerance and broken windows approaches to crime management disproportionately impacted 
African-Americans—in some cities, as many as 80% of young African-American men have a 
record). 
26  Id. at 6 (highlighting how Congress responded to the 9/11 terrorist attacks by passing 
laws subjecting around one million workers to background checks). 
27  Id. at 11 (describing the myriad forms of criminal records in addition to court records 
and RAP sheets, including criminal intelligence databases, police blotters, presentence reports, 
prosecutors’ files, probation files, and jail and prison databases). 
28  Id. at 5 (describing American exceptionalism regarding access to criminal records). 
29  See infra notes 77–85 and accompanying text. 
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prosecuted for relatively low-level offenses.30  This surge in civilian 
encounters with the criminal justice system is attributable at least in part to 
changes in state and federal policy rather than an increase in criminal 
behavior.31  In the wake of President Johnson’s “war against crime,”32 local 
law enforcement agencies swelled with federal Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration grant money,33 which critics argued was used to militarize the 
police.34  These grants grew from $300 million in 1968 to $1.25 billion in 
1974.35 
Federal and state financial support of law enforcement continued to pour 
in under President Reagan’s implementation of the racially charged “war on 
drugs” and prevailing “tough on crime” political attitudes.36  In 1981,  
 
30  See ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR 
CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 
11 (Apr. 2009), available at https://www.nacdl.org/reports/misdemeanor (estimating that 
between 1972 and 2006, the number of annual non-traffic related misdemeanor prosecutions 
rose from 5 million to 10.5 million); Robert LaFountain et al., NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. 
Examining the Work of State Courts: An Analysis of 2010 State Court Caseloads 24 (2012), 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/ 
CSP_DEC.ashx (revealing that in 2010, 77.8% of all cases in seventeen state courts systems 
were misdemeanors); Natapoff, supra note 5, at 1057 (estimating that 10 million misdemeanor 
cases are filed annually in the United States, representing about 80% of state dockets); Jenny 
Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1090 (2013) 
(describing how the criminal justice system has remained busy by targeting petty misdemeanor 
offenses even as rates of serious crimes declined over the last two decades).  
31  See Stephen Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Why Are So Many Americans in Prison?, in 
DO PRISONS MAKE US SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM 65 (Stephen 
Raphael & Michael A. Stoll eds., 2008); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, The Role of Violent Crime 
in U.S. Incarceration Rates (May 2000), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2000/usa/ 
Rcedrg00-02.htm#TopOfPage. But see ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 41 (acknowledging rising 
crime rates in the 1960s).  
32  See, e.g., Elizabeth Hinton, Why We Should Reconsider the War on Crime, TIME (Mar. 
20, 2015), http://time.com/3746059/war-on-crime-history/.  
33  The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 created the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration and made it the conduit for grants that facilitated officer 
recruitment, training, and equipment purchases. See The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).  
34  MALCOLM FEELEY & AUSTIN SARAT, THE POLICY DILEMMA: FEDERAL CRIME POLICY 
AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, 1968–1978 137 (1980) 
(describing how liberal critics of the Nixon administration viewed the purchase of anti-riot 
and military grade gear as an attempt to subdue legitimate anti-war and civil rights protests).  
But see id. at 137–38 (observing that local expenditures of grant money veered away from 
equipment and police forces in the late 1970s). 
35  Marc Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 9, 13 (1999).  LEAA grants surged, but they were still a relatively small fraction of 
overall police budgets.  During the same time that the number of officers increased, so did 
violent and property crime. 
36  See PAGER, supra note 9, at 18 (explaining that a discourse that placed the blame for 
crime on the moral failings of the individual, rather than on society, helped drive the rise of 
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President Reagan signed into law the Military Cooperation with Law  
Enforcement Act, which granted police forces access to military weaponry 
and intelligence in exchange for a promise to prioritize drug law  
enforcement.37  The Byrne grant program enticed the same commitment from 
local police forces through millions of dollars in federal aid.38  In some  
instances, federal funding was directly tied to arrest rates, fueling an increase 
in apprehensions.39 
These changes to federal and state funding for law enforcement  
coincided with an overhaul of penal laws.40  The federal Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984 rejected judicial discretion in favor of mandatory minimum  
sentences for crimes that were previously punished with community service 
and supervision,41 and state legislatures followed suit.42  State and federal 
penal codes also expanded to include new crimes as lawmakers sought to 
assuage public fears of epidemic crime.43  As a result of increased policing, 
 
tough on crime politics); see also Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton: 
How the Tough On Crime Movement Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment 
Discrimination, 15 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 1, 3, 16–19 (2013). 
37  Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Act Pub. L. No. 97–86, 95 Stat. 1099 
(1981); ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 77. 
38  See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1968) 
(authorizing the Byrne Grant Program); ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 77; see also Eric 
Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 
U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 42 (1998) (explaining that the Byrne program became the conduit for 
federal aid to local law enforcement after the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 
expired in 1982; federal funds under Byrne had to go towards waging the Drug War, unlike 
grants under the LEAA). 
39  See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 77 (summarizing a 2001 report in Wisconsin that 
found that the extent of federal funds for local law enforcement was positively correlated with 
the number of drug arrests); id. at 78–79 (describing the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention Control Act of 1970 as the origin of modern drug forfeiture laws and explaining 
that paramilitary drug raids increased from about 300 in 1972 to 3,000 in 1980); RODNEY 
BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES 221–
22 (2013). Lax drug forfeiture laws encouraged police departments to keep the spoils of 
increasingly frequent drug raids.  
40  See JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK 22 (2005) (explaining how electoral 
politics shaped crime policy in the aftermath of urban riots and protests, resulting in the 
collapse of discretionary sentencing).  
41  MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE § 1:5 (2016). The introduction to the Sentencing 
Guidelines predicted that the guidelines would apply to 90% of federal criminal cases, 
although the ultimate goal was to cover all of them.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1.5 (1987). But see Stanley Weigel, The Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36 UCLA L. REV. 83, 97 (1988) (explaining that 
the guidelines were quickly amended to exclude class B and C misdemeanors). 
42  Mauer, supra note 35, at 11. 
43  See THE SMART ON CRIME COAL., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, SMART ON CRIME: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS 2 (2011), 
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harsher punishments, and expanded crimes, more people than ever came into 
contact with the criminal justice system, often for relatively minor offenses. 
The newly expansive reach of the criminal justice system and  
subsequent increase in the number of people with criminal records was  
accompanied by an equally dramatic transformation in the availability of 
criminal history information.  Technological developments—such as the  
replacement of manual record keeping with more automated court and  
criminal justice systems—have enabled unprecedented access to and  
dissemination of criminal records.44  Perhaps most importantly, the Internet 
has greatly increased the ease of a criminal record check, replacing a trip to 
the courthouse in some states with a cursory online search.45 
Technological advances might have had little impact on the availability 
of criminal records without developments in state and federal law that have 
facilitated organization of and public access to massive quantities of criminal 
record data.  In 1967, President Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement 
and Administration of Justice made the case for an efficient nationwide  
system for sharing criminal history information.46  Because such a system 
would be defined by the information it received from the states, the  
Department of Justice issued regulations in the mid-1970s requiring states to 
 
https://constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/SmartOnCrime_Complete.pdf 
(documenting the expansion of the federal criminal code); Mauer, supra note 35, at 15 
(elucidating the relationship between the media’s sensationalistic coverage of crime and public 
support for harsh penal policy); Roberts, supra note 30, at 1090 (noting the growth in 
misdemeanor crimes); William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. 
L. REV. 505, 532 (2001) (describing how the public’s perception of increasing criminality can 
trigger lawmakers to add new crimes to penal codes in an effort to comfort voters).  
44  NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUST. INFO. & STAT., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TASK FORCE 
ON THE COMMERCIAL SALE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE RECORD INFORMATION 29 (2005), 
http://www.search.org/files/pdf/RNTFCSCJRI.pdf. 
45  The internet also provides a forum for advertising commercial background check 
services, augmenting awareness of their availability. Id. at 14. Note that in some states, 
including California, background check companies are still required to review records in 
person at the courthouse. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1786.18(c) (West 2002) (requiring background 
check companies to verify the accuracy of arrest, indictment, and conviction records prior to 
producing a report about those records); id. at § 1786.28(a) (requiring background check 
companies transmitting criminal record information to indicate the source of the information—
which may be a court—and the date it was publicized); id. at § 1786.28(b) (requiring 
background check companies that are furnishing criminal record information to a prospective 
employer to maintain procedures designed to ensure that the information that the companies 
provide is current). 
46  JACOBS, supra note 11, at 40 (describing how this push for a nationwide system resulted 
in a national RAP sheet system called the Interstate Identification Index, which allows a law 
enforcement officer anywhere in the country to check, almost instantaneously, whether a 
suspect has a criminal record in any jurisdiction). 
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maintain accurate and complete criminal records.47 
States responded by establishing central repositories for criminal record 
storage and adopting their own laws concerning dissemination of such  
information.48  These laws occupy a spectrum ranging from laxity (allowing 
disclosure of every non-expunged record on file) to strict regulation (limiting 
public disclosure to adult conviction data that are less than ten years old).49  
Notably, however, these restrictions apply only to the criminal records 
housed in state repositories.  They do not apply to criminal records in the 
courthouses themselves, which historically have been open for constitutional 
and policy reasons.50  Today, court records in forty-eight states are easily 
accessible online.51 
If state and federal law enforcement policies and priorities increased the 
number of people with criminal records, and law and technology expanded 
ease of access to such records, post-9/11 security fears increased the demand 
for records.52  In the wake of the 2001 attacks, Congress passed laws 
requiring background checks on truck drivers transporting hazardous 
materials (the Patriot Act),53 workers with access to secure portions of the 
airport (the Aviation and Transportation Security Act),54 and people who 
work with biological agents.55  Private employers turned to background check 
companies more frequently after the attacks, adding security fears to the list 
of business justifications for conducting the checks.56 
 
47  See 28 C.F.R. § 20.21(a) (1976). 
48  NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUST. INFO. & STAT., supra note 44, at 38 (describing how the 
DOJ regulations gave states the freedom to develop their own laws). 
49  Id. at 40. 
50  Policy reasons include maintenance of the public’s trust in the integrity of the judicial 
system and insulation from attempts to usurp the courts for private purposes. See id. at 45; see 
also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia., 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (holding that there is 
a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials. 
51  Privacy/Public Access to Court Records: State Links, NAT. CTR. FOR ST. CTS., 
http://www.ncsc.org/topics/access-and-fairness/privacy-public-access-to-court-records/state-
links.aspx (last visited May 16, 2016) (providing a list of forty-eight states plus the federal 
government that offer online links to court records). 
52  NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUST. INFO. & STAT., supra note 44, at 1. 
53  See 49 U.S.C. § 5103a (2001). At the time of its passage, the law subjected an estimated 
3.5 million employees to background checks. Ruth Graham, How Criminal Records Hold 
Americans Back, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 8, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2015/03/ 
08/how-criminal-records-hold-americans-back/bFnOmPhZKeimlafcPU5mmI/story.html.  
54  49 U.S.C. § 5103a(d) (2001); id. at § 114(f)(12).  
55  Public Health Security & Bioterrorism Preparedness & Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
107–188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002). 
56  For example, two days after 9/11, Empire International spent $40,000 on background 
checks for its 500 drivers; within a week of the attacks, Comforce Corporation ordered 
background checks on all employees in the information technology or internet security 
divisions. Eve Tahmincioglu, Tense Employers Step Up Background Checks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
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Background check companies benefited from heightened security  
concerns. ChoicePoint, for example, reported a 30% increase in business 
from security firms immediately after 9/11, and HireCheck reported a 25% 
increase in business overall.57  Background check companies registered  
surging revenue associated with employee screening even as hiring faltered 
in the economy overall.58  In the post-9/11 era of heightened security, new 
safety worries fueled expansion in an already growing criminal record  
information industry.59 
B. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL RECORDS 
Taken together, aggressive criminalization, advanced technology, a  
permissive legal framework, and heightened security concerns have left a 
huge number of Americans marked by criminal records.  According to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, approximately 74 million Americans, or  
almost one of every three adults, have files in the nation’s master criminal 
database.60  The FBI adds 10,000 to 12,000 new names every day.61  As of its 
most recent report on the issue, the U.S. Department of Justice identified 
more than 105 million people with state criminal record files, including more 
than 100 million records that are automated, although individuals may have 
records in more than one state.62 
While arrest and prosecution records are widespread across the adult 
population, mass criminalization is heavily racialized.  By the age of twenty-
three, almost half of all African-American men (49%) and Latino men (44%) 
have been arrested.63  In San Francisco in 2013, 45.5% of all females arrested 
were African-American even though they made up only 5.8% of the total 
 
3, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/03/business/management-tense-employers-step-
up-background-checks.html. See also NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUST. INFO. & STAT., supra note 
44, at 35 (explaining that businesses often point to their bottom line to justify background 
checks, emphasizing the cost of negligent hiring lawsuits, wasted training resources due to 
recidivism-related employee turnover, and employee theft).  
57  Tahmincioglu, supra note 56. 
58  NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUST. INFO. & STAT., supra note 44, at 32. 
59  Tahmincioglu, supra note 56 (describing the pre-9/11 growth in criminal background 
checks due to employers’ efforts to decrease liability associated with negligent hiring law-
suits). 
60  FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 6, at 1.  
61  Gary Fields & John Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find Consequences 
Can Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-arrest-
records-rise-americans-find-consequences-can-last-a-lifetime-1408415402.  
62  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2014: A CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY REPORT 2 (2015), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/249799.pdf. 
63  Brame et al., supra note 7. 
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female population.64  These disparities exist even when controlling for  
underlying criminal activity,65 so people of color are overrepresented among 
those who are forced to navigate the increasingly intricate web of  
consequences associated with a criminal record. 
The consequences flowing from a criminal record extend beyond any 
court-ordered punishment.  These indirect consequences of an arrest or  
prosecution are labeled “collateral,” and they are so myriad that Congress 
tasked the National Institute of Justice with cataloging them in a nationwide 
inventory.66  Across the nation, according to inventory estimates, people with 
criminal records are subjected to roughly 45,000 sanctions, disabilities,  
disqualifications, or other negative consequences.67  This total does not  
provide a complete picture because private actors such as landlords and  
employers can discriminate against people with criminal records even in the 
absence of any state-promulgated law or rule.68 
Significantly, collateral consequences attach not only to felonies, but 
also to misdemeanors, which comprise roughly 80% of state court criminal 
dockets.69  California law, for example, includes at least ninety mandatory 
 
64  MICHAEL MALES, CTR. ON JUV. & CRIM. JUST., SAN FRANCISCO’S DISPROPORTIONATE 
ARREST OF AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN PERSISTS 1 (2015), http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/ 
documents/disproportionate_arrests_in_san_francisco.pdf.  
65  For example, despite similar rates of marijuana use, African-Americans were almost 
four times as likely as whites to be arrested for possession of marijuana between 2001 and 
2010. EZEKIEL EDWARDS ET AL., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN 
BLACK AND WHITE 4 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/ 
1114413-mj-report-rfs-rel1.pdf. 
66  See Project Description, JUSTICE CTR.: THE COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’TS, 
http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/description/#fn1 (last visited May 17, 2016) 
(describing how a provision of the Court Security Improvement Act of 2007 directed the 
National Institute of Justice to create the inventory [Public Law 110–177, Jan. 7, 2008]; the 
American Bar Association ended up winning the contract).  
67  Nat’l Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, JUSTICE CTR: THE 
COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’TS, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org (last visited Sept. 12, 
2017); see also LOVE ET AL., supra note 41, at § 1:2 (the introduction to the leading treatise on 
collateral consequences). 
68 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission warned in 2012 that such 
discrimination in the employment setting, even when applied consistently against all people 
with records, may be illegal under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 given the extreme 
likelihood of a disparate impact on racial minorities. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, EEOC: CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT 
DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (Apr. 25, 2012), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm#I; see also David Thacher, The 
Rise of Criminal Background Screening in Rental Housing, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 5, 12 (2008) 
(roughly four of every five landlords in the private market use background checks to screen 
prospective tenants). 
69  Natapoff, supra note 5, at 1057; see also Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 101, 108 (2012) (estimating that in California, misdemeanors comprise 75 to 
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and 382 discretionary consequences associated with misdemeanor  
convictions.70  In California, a misdemeanor conviction can lead to job loss, 
disqualification from unemployment insurance,71 revocation of the right to 
bear arms,72 and disqualification from serving as an alternative caregiver to a 
child.73  A misdemeanor drug offense like simple possession can make a  
student ineligible for federal loans.74 
The consequences associated with misdemeanor convictions must be 
considered in light of the high volume of such cases moving through the 
criminal justice system and attendant concerns about due process.  Ninety-
five percent of misdemeanor convictions are the result of people who have 
pleaded guilty, often after speaking with a public defender for a few minutes, 
or in some cases, not at all.75  With dockets overflowing, lower courts fail to 
adequately scrutinize misdemeanor convictions and all too often approve ill-
advised plea agreements.76  Even people not convicted of misdemeanors can 
suffer a range of collateral consequences from going through the system, 
which raises serious questions about fairness and undue burdens.77 
 
80% of filed cases). 
70  See California, JUSTICE CTR.: THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, 
http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/search/?jurisdiction=10 (last visited June 5, 2016). 
71  See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1030.1 (1968). 
72  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 28905 (2010) (listing roughly forty misdemeanor convictions 
that trigger a ten-year ban on the right to bear arms). 
73  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 89378 (2002). 
74  20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2006).  
75  See ALISA SMITH ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THREE MINUTE 
JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 7 (2011) (characterizing 
misdemeanor courts in twenty-one Florida counties as “constitution-free zones” where two-
thirds of defendants plead guilty or no contest at their arraignments—which last only three 
minutes—80% of the time); K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives From Broken Windows: The 
Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 271, 294–95 (2009) (explaining that though public defenders in New York City 
theoretically have about 19.5 minutes with each client pre-arraignment—during which they 
must review the client’s file, interview the client, explain potential charges and responses, 
make bail arrangements, speak with family members in the court, confer with the district 
attorney regarding potential dispositions and present the case to the court—in practice, plea 
deals are so routine that many clients get even less time with their attorney); Natapoff, supra 
note 5, at 1064.  
76  Natapoff, supra note 5, at 1064. 
77  See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119 
AM. J. OF SOC. 351, 386 (2013) (analyzing the flow of misdemeanor cases through the criminal 
court in New York City and discovering that such a system affects even many people who 
have not been convicted, marking them with a record, subjecting them to time-consuming 
procedural hassle, and requiring compliance with court-dictated terms). 
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C. CRIMINAL RECORDS AND EMPLOYMENT 
Background checks have become a routine component of the job hunt 
for Americans, making it difficult for many people with criminal records to 
find work.  As noted above, background checks mandated by federal law 
have increased since 9/11,78 and state law trends are similar.  Under the  
authority of a 1972 federal law, state legislatures have enacted over 1,600 
statutes requiring background checks by law enforcement agencies, including 
the FBI.79  Many of these statutes require background checks for licensed 
positions or employment in licensed facilities, affecting aspiring nurses,  
caregivers, custodians, pet groomers, security guards, and barbers, to name a 
few.80  A criminal record can also render a person ineligible for government 
jobs.81 
In the private sector, criminal background checks have become the 
norm.  According to a 2012 survey conducted by the Society of Human  
Resources Management, an organization of mostly large employers, 87% of 
its randomly selected members conducted criminal background checks on 
some prospective employees and 69% conduct such checks on all  
employees.82  Some employers discriminate further by telling people with 
 
78  See supra notes 52–59 and accompanying text.  
79  See 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(j) (West 2017) (granting the Director of the FBI the power to 
exchange criminal record information with the states); Madeleine Neighly & Maurice 
Emsellem, Wanted: Accurate FBI Background Checks for Employment, THE NAT’L EMP. L. 
PROJECT 7 (July 2013), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/02/Report-Wanted-
Accurate-FBI-Background-Checks-Employment-1.pdf; see also 28 C.F.R. § 50.12(a)(West 
2017) (specifying that the exchange of such information can be used for employment and 
licensing-related inquiries). 
80  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., supra note 62, at Table 17 (cataloging 
state laws requiring fingerprint-based background checks for nurses/elder caregivers (thirty-
seven jurisdictions); daycare providers (forty-two jurisdictions); caregivers at residential 
facilities (thirty-five jurisdictions); school teachers (forty-eight jurisdictions); nonteaching 
school employees, including volunteers (forty jurisdictions); volunteers working with children 
(thirty-one jurisdictions); prospective foster care parents (forty-eight jurisdictions); 
prospective adoptive parents (forty-seven jurisdictions); relative caregivers (twenty-one 
jurisdictions); and hazardous materials licensees (twenty-one jurisdictions)). Among the top 
six licensed professions in California by number are nurses (400,134), teachers (295,025), 
security guards (282,189), and cosmetologists (254,271). See also LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, 
REPORT #234, OCTOBER 2016: JOBS FOR CALIFORNIANS: STRATEGIES TO EASE OCCUPATIONAL 
LICENSING BARRIERS 17 (2016), http://www.lhc.ca.gov/report/jobs-californians-strategies-
ease-occupational-licensing-barriers.  
81  See LOVE ET AL., supra note 41, at § 2:8. 
82  See SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT., BACKGROUND CHECKING—THE USE OF 
CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS IN HIRING DECISIONS (2012), available at 
https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys/pages/criminal 
backgroundcheck.aspx.  
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criminal records, including misdemeanors, not to apply at all.83 
These trends have resulted in a massive number of criminal background 
checks.  The FBI released almost 17 million RAP sheets for the purpose of 
employment and licensing background checks in 2012, a more than sixfold 
increase since 2002.84  The California Attorney General processed over 2 
million background checks in 2014.85  That same year, three of the largest 
background check companies for private employers reported screening 56 
million individuals nationwide.86 
Inaccuracies in criminal history information exacerbate the employment 
prospects of people with records.  One study estimated that the failure to  
update arrest records (to reflect that the arrest did not result in a conviction) 
prejudices 600,000 people each year, and approximately one half of the  
records in the FBI’s database are incomplete in some way.87  These  
inaccuracies stem from deficiencies in states’ administration of records, on 
which the FBI relies to update its database.88  Private background check  
companies often share inaccurate information—according to critics, reports 
produced by commercial screening companies frequently contain  
information about the wrong person, report sealed records, omit the most  
recent disposition of a case, render data in a misleading manner, misclassify 
the type of offense (e.g., they report a misdemeanor as a felony), or report 
information protected from disclosure by consumer and privacy laws.89 
 
83  For example, a survey of Craigslist job ads revealed that employers large and small 
frequently single out people with records by using language like: “DO NOT APPLY WITH 
ANY MISDEMEANORS/FELONIES.” See MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE 
EMSELLEM, THE NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, 65 MILLION “NEED NOT APPLY”: THE CASE FOR 
REFORMING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 1 (2011), 
http://www.nelp.org/page/-/65_million_need_not_apply.pdf?nocdn=1. As noted above, this 
practice may be unlawful under the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s most 
recent enforcement guidance for Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which requires an 
individualized assessment of a criminal record’s relevance to the job opportunity. See U.S. 
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 68. 
84  See Neighly & Emsellem, supra note 79, at 8. 
85  “During the 2014 calender [sic] year, the Department of Justice (DOJ) processed more 
than 2.1 million applicant fingerprint transactions.” See Applicant Agencies, STATE OF CAL. 
DEP’T OF JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/fingerprints/agencies (last visited Nov. 5, 2016). 
86  See Max Mihelich, Special Report: More ‘Background’ Noise, WORKFORCE (Sept. 5, 
2014), http://www.workforce.com/2014/09/05/special-report-more-background-noise/. 
87  Neighly & Emsellem, supra note 79, at 3; see also JACOBS supra note 11, at 42 
(explaining that in 2012, only eighteen states had rap sheet databases that reported final 
dispositions for more than 80% of arrests). 
88  Neighly & Emsellem, supra note 79, at 2. 
89  See PERSIS YU & SHARON DIETRICH, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., BROKEN RECORDS: 
HOW ERRORS BY CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKING COMPANIES HARM WORKERS AND 
BUSINESSES 15 (2012), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/broken-records-
report.pdf; cf. Cal. Civ. Code § 1786.1 et seq. (1975) (the California Investigative Consumer 
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Though most research has focused on the impact of a prison record on 
employment opportunities, including low applicant callback rates and  
depressed wages over time,90 criminal records of arrests and misdemeanors 
can also serve as significant barriers to employment.91  A minor criminal  
record can prevent a qualified applicant from being interviewed or getting a 
job.92  Even an employer who expresses a willingness to hire applicants with 
criminal records may not actually do so.93  A minor criminal record may also 
be the basis of a licensing board’s denial or revocation of a professional  
 
Reporting Agencies Act regulates background checks conducted by private companies); 15 
U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (1970) (the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act regulates the criminal 
background check industry and the reports that it produces on prospective employees). 
90  See, e.g., SCOTT DECKER ET AL., CRIMINAL STIGMA, RACE, GENDER, AND EMPLOYMENT: 
AN EXPANDED ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF IMPRISONMENT FOR EMPLOYMENT 36 
(2014), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/244756.pdf (finding that a prison record 
marginally decreased women’s chances of obtaining employment across racial groups); 
PAGER, supra note 9, at 61–70 (finding in a landmark audit study of employers in Milwaukee 
that a prison record decreases chances of receiving a callback by 50% for white males and 
60% for African-American males); Christopher J. Lyons & Becky Pettit, Compounded 
Disadvantage: Race, Incarceration, and Wage Growth, 58 SOC. PROBS. 257, 271 (2011) 
(finding that within the studied cohort, the wages of African-American ex-inmates grew 21% 
more slowly than did those of white ex-inmates); Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment and 
Economic Inequality, 74 SOC. RES. 509, 524 (2007) (explaining that African-American and 
Hispanic men who have spent time in prison work about eight weeks less each year than 
African-American and Hispanic men who have not spent time in prison, while white men who 
have spent time in prison work only five weeks less each year than white men who have not). 
91  See DECKER ET AL., supra note 90, at 53 (fourteen of forty-nine employers said they 
probably would not hire someone who had been arrested and an additional four said that they 
definitely would not); Christopher Uggen et al., The Edge of Stigma: An Experimental Audit 
of the Effects of Low-Level Criminal Records on Employment, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 627, 637 
(2014) (finding that a record of a misdemeanor arrest reduced the chance of a callback for 
white and African-American males by 4%).  
92  See Holzer et al., supra note 9, at 117, 122 (revealing that over 40% of surveyed 
employers in Los Angeles definitely would not or probably would not be willing to hire 
someone with a criminal record); Sarah Esther Lageson et al., Legal Ambiguity in Managerial 
Assessments of Criminal Records, 40 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 175, 191 (2015) (finding that about 
30% of “natural organizations”—employers who have no explicit policy on treatment of 
criminal records in hiring—filtered out applicants with misdemeanor records in deciding who 
to call back); Natapoff, supra note 5, at 113 (explaining that the majority of employers conduct 
background checks and many choose not to interview people convicted of misdemeanors); 
Roberts, supra note 9, at 299–300 (describing how employers easily access criminal record 
information online and use it to avoid hiring people with records).  
93  See Devah Pager & Lincoln Quillian, Walking the Talk? What Employers Say Versus 
What They Do, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 355, 364, 367 (2005) (finding that employers who had 
expressed a willingness in their survey responses to hire those with criminal records were in 
practice just as unlikely to hire them as those who had responded to the contrary); Lageson et 
al., supra note 92, at 191 (showing that 78% of employers who expressed a willingness to hire 
applicants with criminal records did not call back any of the applicants with misdemeanor 
records).  
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license.94  And although background check companies are not supposed to 
report most criminal history information in California (including a  
misdemeanor conviction) after seven years,95 a California regulatory  
licensing agency can require that such information be available to prospective 
employers indefinitely.96 
Criminal records follow tens of millions of Americans like a shadow, 
long after their arrest or any punishment associated with their crime has been 
completed.  Criminal records stigmatize people and create collateral  
consequences that limit their opportunities.  Even when a criminal record 
does not serve as a complete bar to employment, it can affect employment 
opportunities and earnings over time.97  In recent years, some states have  
responded to this problem by enacting laws designed to mitigate the negative 
effect of a criminal record on employment outcomes, yet obstacles persist for 
many. 
In the next Part, we discuss record clearing, or “unmarking,” which has 
emerged in an effort to help people with criminal records overcome barriers 
to employment. 
II. UNMARKING: THE RECORD CLEARING REMEDY 
Criminal record clearing remedies of one kind or another are available 
in all fifty states.98  While the efficacy of judicial record clearing is the focus 
of our inquiry, non-judicial remedies are available to people with records, 
including executive pardon and administrative appeal.99 Judicial, executive, 
and administrative remedies differ across the states and offer varying degrees 
of relief from the penalties and collateral consequences associated with a 
criminal record.100 
 
94  See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 480 (West 1974) (allowing a licensing board that 
regulates a license covered by the code to reject an application based on any conviction); 
California, supra note 70 (showing that there are fifty mandatory consequences in the realm 
of professional licensing for people with misdemeanor convictions).  
95  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1786.18(a)(7) (West 1975). 
96  See id. at § 1786.18(b)(2).  
97  See generally SHAWN BUSHWAY ET AL., RUSSELL SAGE, BARRIERS TO REENTRY? THE 
LABOR MARKET FOR RELEASED PRISONERS IN POST-INDUSTRIAL AMERICA (2007); Simone 
Ispa-Landa & Charles E. Loeffler, Indefinite Punishment and the Criminal-Record: Stigma 
Reports among Expungement-Seekers in Illinois, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 387 (2016). 
98  LOVE ET AL., supra note 41, at § 7:1. 
99  Id. at § 7:2.  
100  As Loeffler et al., supra note 21, at 5–6 point out, people with criminal records have 
also used informal, non-legal strategies to overcome employment obstacles. See generally 
ROBERT SAMPSON & JOHN LAUB, SHARED BEGINNINGS, DIVERGENT LIVES: DELINQUENT BOYS 
TO AGE 70 (2003) (describing how, before the age of the background check, the studied group 
of juvenile delinquents was able to pass as non-criminal and thereby avoid labor market 
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The executive pardon— a form of unmarking theoretically available in 
every state—is rarely used.101  Few governors regularly exercise their pardon 
power, and perhaps because of this, few people apply to be pardoned.102  Use 
of the presidential pardon, which is the exclusive remedy available for people 
convicted in federal court or in a military court-martial proceeding, has also 
waned considerably in a trend that began during the Reagan  
administration.103  Pardons generally are reserved for salient cases (e.g.,  
evidence of innocence in association with many years served) and are neither 
numerous enough nor targeted in such a way as to address the large number 
of people with criminal records consisting of relatively minor offenses. 
Administrative agencies offer people with criminal records another  
potential source of relief.  An individual facing denial or rescission of a  
professional license or clearance to work in a licensed facility can generally 
file an appeal.104  However, the laws, regulations, and practices vary from 
state to state, within states, and across licensing entities.  Although 
administrative remedies are of increasing interest to policymakers seeking to 
expand employment opportunities, they remain opaque and inaccessible to 
many people with criminal records.105 
 
discrimination); SHADD MARUNA, MAKING GOOD: HOW EX-CONVICTS REFORM AND REBUILD 
THEIR LIVES (2001) (observing that many people who have refrained from recidivating often 
seek jobs for which their criminal record will not serve as an obstacle); NEAL SHOVER, AGING 
CRIMINALS 75–76 (1985) (arguing that a group of people who repeatedly committed property 
crimes eventually benefited from stigma erosion—a process by which a marked person’s 
perceived criminality dissipates with time). 
101  See Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866) (holding that pardon not only terminates 
punishment, but eradicates guilt so that “in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if 
he had never committed the offence”). In every state but one, the state constitution is the source 
of the power to pardon.  See LOVE ET AL., supra note 41, at § 7:6. 
102  Margaret Colgate Love, Starting over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten 
Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1720–21 (2003) (explaining 
how the pardon application process has become increasingly difficult to navigate, often 
requiring a substantial time commitment, submission to background checks and invasive 
procedures, and completion of large amounts of paperwork).  
103  See Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1170–71 (2010). But see President Obama Announces Single Largest Set 
of Clemency Grants Since Taking Office, CLEMENCY PROJECT 2014 (Aug. 3, 2016), 
https://justiceroundtable.org/news-item/president-obama-announces-single-largest-set-of-
clemency-grants-since-taking-office/ (noting that President Obama has commuted 562 
sentences, more than any president since Calvin Coolidge).  
104  LOVE ET AL., supra note 41, at § 7:5. 
105  See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY ET AL., OCCUPATIONAL 
LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS (July 2015), https://obamawhitehouse. 
archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing_report_final_nonembargo.pdf.  Administrative 
rules can also protect people with criminal records from discrimination.  For example, 
California’s Department of Fair Employment and Housing is currently considering changes to 
rules that would supplement the guidance issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
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It is difficult to generalize about the wide variety of judicial record  
clearing remedies.  Such remedies predate the modern criminal records  
problem, and they go by many names—expungement, expunction, dismissal, 
vacatur, sealing, annulment, and set-asides. The benefits of the record  
clearing remedies are equally varied.  In some states, “sealing” and  
“expungement” are synonymous, yet these terms can also have distinct  
meanings, with “expungement” entailing the destruction of a record to which 
“sealing” would merely prohibit access.106 
Sealing and expungement remedies often permit people to state on some 
employment applications that they have never been convicted when asked 
about their criminal record history.107  Vacatur, set-aside and annulment are 
forgiveness remedies.108  Under such remedies, people may still need to  
disclose a criminal conviction when asked about it, but in theory they are 
relieved from some forms of legally sanctioned discrimination.109 
In this Part, we provide a brief overview of judicial record clearing.  We 
describe recent developments in public defender offices, civil legal aid 
programs, and law school clinics designed to help people with criminal  
records seek such judicial remedies as a means of overcoming the collateral 
consequences outlined earlier.  Finally, we note efforts by the federal  
government to support and expand record clearing interventions. 
 
Commission to limit the use of criminal records in the hiring process.  See generally FAIR EMP. 
& HOUS. COUNCIL, FURTHER MODIFICATIONS TO TEXT OF PROPOSED CONSIDERATION OF 
CRIMINAL HISTORY IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS REGULATION (Sept. 7, 2016).  
106  See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 18. 
107  The National Council on Crime and Delinquency proposed a model act in 1962 that 
exemplifies this approach to rehabilitation. See Nat’l Council on Crime & 
Delinquency, Annulment of a Conviction of Crime: A Model Act, 8 CRIME & DELINQ. 97, 100 
(1962). Advocates of the “forget” approach to criminal record clearing remedies argue that the 
ability of a person with a criminal record to reintegrate into society should not depend on 
whether others are able to forgive. See JENNY ROBERTS, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAW., 
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AMERICA’S FAILURE TO FORGIVE OR FORGET IN THE WAR ON CRIME 48–
49 (2014), available at https://www.nacdl.org/restoration/roadmapreport/. 
108  See Love, supra note 102, at 1705 (arguing that forgiveness-oriented remedies are 
superior to forgetting remedies like expungement because they do not proceed on the awkward 
fiction—increasingly untenable in the information age—that the past can be re-written).  The 
American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code advocated for a forgiveness-driven approach.  
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.6(3)(f) (1962) (stating that the code does not justify a defendant 
in saying that he or she has not been convicted of a crime, unless he or she also mentions the 
forgiveness granted by the model penal code).  But see Roberts, supra note 5, at 338–41 
(arguing that forgiveness is a conceptually strained approach in light of a flawed and racially 
discriminatory criminal justice system in which culpability may be unrelated to a criminal 
record). 
109  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.6 (allowing the court to enter an order relieving the 
beneficiary of “any disqualification or disability imposed by law”); see also LOVE ET AL., 
supra note 41, at § 7:21.  
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A. JUDICIAL RECORD CLEARING REMEDIES 
All states provide an unmarking remedy for at least some people with 
records of arrests and prosecutions, typically for arrests alone or less serious 
crimes.  In some states the remedies are very limited, but two-thirds of states 
provide for sealing of records of arrests that did not lead to a conviction, 
which happens either automatically or after a discretionary court order.110  
Twenty-six states and Puerto Rico provide for judicial record clearing of  
minor offenses, ranging from infractions to misdemeanors.111 
Few states provide judicial record clearing remedies for felony  
convictions and under much more narrow circumstances.112 Even in those 
states, violent crimes and sex offenses generally do not qualify, and expunged 
records can still be accessed for the purposes of sentencing a repeat  
offender.113  Despite the range of judicial record clearing mechanisms in the 
states, there is no expungement mechanism for records of federal arrests and 
prosecutions.114 
Recently, some state legislatures have begun expanding the scope of  
judicial remedies.  According to a survey of state laws conducted by the Vera 
Institute, from 2009 to 2014, twenty-three states and the District of Columbia 
enacted a total of thirty-seven new laws that create or expand record clearing 
 
110  LOVE ET AL., supra note 41, at § 7:21.  In the majority of those states, sealing can 
happen even after a defendant pleads guilty as part of deferred sentencing or adjudication.  Id. 
111  Id. at Chart 4, App. A. 
112  See Love, supra note 102, at 1717 (explaining that the shift in political attitudes 
towards crime around the time of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 caused legislatures to 
begin weakening their expungement statutes). 
113  LOVE ET AL., supra note 41, at § 7:17.  Puerto Rico has the most expansive record 
clearing scheme, allowing for expungement of even violent felony offenses if five years have 
elapsed since the sentence was served and the person has a “good reputation within the 
community.”  Id.; P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 34, §§ 1725a-2 (1974). 
114  LOVE ET AL., supra note 41, at § 7:17. Even non-conviction records, such as an arrest 
without an indictment, cannot be cleared.  Id. at § 7:20. However, federal judges can mitigate 
the negative effects of a criminal record in other ways.  See Order Denying Motion to Expunge 
at 2, Jane Doe v. United States, No. 1:15-MC-01174 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (in which a now retired 
federal judge cited congressional and executive reentry efforts to support his granting of a 
“federal certificate of rehabilitation” for a defendant he had sentenced years before who had 
subsequently struggled in the job market).  And in 2014 the U.S. Sentencing Commission—
an independent agency of the federal judicial branch—voted to reduce the sentencing 
guidelines for many federal drug offenses and made the reform retroactive.  In late 2015, those 
changes resulted in the release of over 6,000 people who were in federal prison. See Michael 
Schmidt, U.S. to Release 6,000 Inmates from Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/us/us-to-release-6000-inmates-under-new-sentencing-
guidelines.html; The Marshall Project, What You Need to Know About the New Federal 
Prisoner Release, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 29, 2015), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/10/06/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-new-
federal-prisoner-release#.AFxv6CN2H. 
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remedies.115  Examples of such laws include extending record clearing  
eligibility to people with prior convictions (as opposed to first-time  
offenders) and juveniles,116 reducing the waiting periods preceding  
eligibility, clarifying the effect of criminal record clearance, and lowering the 
burden of proof required to clear a record.117 
B. LEGAL INTERVENTION FOR PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 
Lawyers in multiple settings have developed specialized initiatives to 
assist people seeking criminal record clearing remedies.  Some public  
defender offices have moved in the direction of holistic defense, including 
providing post-conviction record clearing assistance to clients.118  Civil legal 
aid programs, traditionally focused on non-criminal matters, have begun 
helping clients to overcome the collateral consequences of criminal  
records.119  And law school teaching clinics have launched record clearing 
projects as part of the response to mass criminalization in their  
communities.120 
 
115  See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 13; Joshua Gaines, Excessive filing fees 
frustrate new expungement schemes, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR. (June 3, 2016), 
http://ccresourcecenter.org/2016/06/03/excessive-fees-frustrate-purpose-of-expungement-
laws/ (lamenting the often prohibitively expensive filing fees associated with expungement in 
Kentucky, Louisiana, and Tennessee).  But see Margaret Colgate Love, States “rethinking” 
collateral consequences? Vera Institute jumps the gun, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. 
CTR. (Jan. 7, 2015), http://ccresourcecenter.org/2015/01/07/states-rethinking-collateral-
consequences-not-fast-vera-institute/ (arguing that the Vera Institute’s report provides an 
overly optimistic picture of the landscape of state law collateral consequences and suffers from 
methodological flaws).  
116  See Assem. 1945, Cal. State Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (clarifying that a 
juvenile criminal record that has been sealed according to Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 781 or 786 may only be revealed to the extent permitted by those sections). 
117  See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 13–17; Brian M. Murray, A New Era for 
Expungement Law Reform? Recent Developments at the State and Federal Levels, 10 HARV. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 361 (2016). 
118  See infra notes 122–26.  
119  See infra note 129. 
120  In addition to public defenders, civil legal aid programs, and law school clinics, private 
sector attorneys have begun offering criminal record clearing services in recent years.  For 
example, the Fresh Start Law Center was founded in 2011 and focuses exclusively on criminal 
record clearing in California. California Record Expungement, FRESH START LAW CTR., 
http://freshstartlawcenter.com/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).  Criminal defense firms have also 
started offering such services.  For example, the Shouse California Law Group specializes in 
criminal record clearing and has offices throughout the state. Expungement of Criminal 
Records in California Penal Code 1203.4 PC, SHOUSE CAL. LAW GRP., 
http://www.shouselaw.com/expunge-criminal-records.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).  More 
research is needed to determine the extent of private sector criminal record clearing services, 
but it appears that as the need for such assistance grows, the private sector will meet some of 
the demand, at least for people who can afford to hire a lawyer. 
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In the public defender setting, some offices have recently expanded the 
traditional model of criminal defense representation.  As awareness of the 
collateral consequences of criminal records has grown, public defenders are 
embracing a holistic approach to representation that extends beyond the  
confines of the criminal case.121  Holistic representation has been described 
as an effort to identify and treat the issues that brought the client into contact 
with the criminal justice system in the first place in order to reduce harm and 
prevent future criminal behavior.122  Public defender offices are beginning to 
offer record clearing services to mitigate the impact of collateral  
consequences, despite the fact that these civil penalties technically fall  
outside the domain of criminal defense work.123 
A comprehensive picture of record clearing work in public defender  
offices is hard to paint due to variations in local jurisdictions.  The Bronx 
Defenders in New York City pioneered holistic representation, including  
expungement services, in its Civil Action Practice.124  The San Francisco 
Public Defender’s Office launched its Clean Slate Program in 1999; in 2015, 
the program served over 6,570 people, obtaining sets asides and dismissals 
of 514 convictions and reducing forty-six felonies to misdemeanors.125   
Public defender offices operate record clearing programs in other California 
cities,126 and in the District of Columbia, Philadelphia, and Cincinnati.127 
 
121  See Robin Steinberg & David Feige, Cultural Revolution: Transforming the Public 
Defender’s Office, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 123, 124 (2004).  This embrace may 
not always be voluntary.  See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (holding that 
public defenders must inform their clients when a plea poses a risk of deportation). 
122  Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral 
Consequences and Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067, 
1067 (2003). 
123  Id. at 1073–74. 
124  Civil Action Practice, THE BRONX DEFENDERS,  http://www.bronxdefenders.org/our-
work/civil-action-practice/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). 
125  S.F. PUB. DEFENDER’S OFF., 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 2016 CALENDAR: PUBLIC 
DEFENDERS, http://sfpublicdefender.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/01/2015-Report-
2016-Calendar.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). 
126  For example, the Orange County Public Defender’s Office operates the New Leaf 
Program and “assists those who are seeking a fresh start and improved opportunities for 
employment, professional licensing or consumer credit.” New Leaf Program, ORANGE 
COUNTY PUB. DEFENDER, http://www.pubdef.ocgov.com/programs/new_leaf_program/ 
default.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). The Alameda County Public Defender operates a 
collaborative record clearing clinic with the East Bay Community Law Center. Clean Slate 
Program, ALAMEDA COUNTY PUB. DEFENDER, http://www.co.alameda.ca.us/defender/ 
services/cleanslate.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). 
127 Defender Ass’n of Phila., JUV. LAW CTR., http://www.jlc.org/resources/county-
resource-guide/philadelphia/defender-association-philadelphia (last visited Apr. 10, 2016); 
Fresh Start Expungement Clinic, HAMILTON COUNTY PUB. DEFENDER, 
http://www.hamiltoncountypd.org/index.php?page=fresh-start-2 (last visited Apr. 10, 2016); 
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On the civil side, record clearing services have recently proliferated in 
legal aid programs, many of which are funded by the federal Legal Services 
Corporation (“LSC”).  Although LSC-funded programs cannot represent  
clients in criminal law matters, grantees are not prohibited from handling 
criminal record clearing designed to address the civil collateral consequences 
of prior arrests and convictions.128  Based on the most recent data compiled 
by the agency, more than two dozen record clearing legal aid programs are 
operating in nineteen states.129 
Community Legal Services (“CLS”) of Philadelphia is a non-LSC 
funded civil legal aid program with a holistic approach to advocacy.  CLS 
seeks record expungement on behalf of individual clients and advocates for 
systemic reform.130  In 2014, of the 1,400 people who sought help from CLS 
with employment problems, over two-thirds had problems that stemmed from 
their criminal records.131  CLS has also filed lawsuits against a background 
check company that was reporting expunged records and against LexisNexis 
for its operation of a retail theft database which contained records for many 
innocent people and erected industry wide employment barriers.132 
Law school clinics have also launched record clearing programs of  
various kinds.  At least three dozen law schools now operate such a clinic, 
and many pioneered programs in their geographic areas.133  The clinics  
 
The Civil Legal Services Division, PUB. DEFENDER SERVICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 
http://www.pdsdc.org/about-us/legal-services/civil-legal-services-division (last visited Apr. 
10, 2016).  Not all states allow public defenders to provide record clearing services.  For 
instance, under Illinois law, the Office of the State Appellate Defender does not have the 
authority to represent a client in a petition to expunge or seal a record.  See 20 Ill. Comp. State. 
2630/11 (2004); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/10.6 (2003).  Instead, the Office is required to provide 
clients with information about the expungement process and other entities that might be able 
to aid in their representation.  Id. 
128  See 45 C.F.R. §§ 1613.1–4 (2014).  
129  Legal Aid Reentry Projects for people with criminal records and other significant 
barriers to employment, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/probono 
_public_service/resources/volunteer_opportunities/reentry_projects.html (last visited Apr. 10, 
2016).  Not all of these programs are LSC-funded, and the list does not include LSC pro bono 
projects operating in collaboration with local and state bar associations or bar foundations. 
130  For example, CLS developed a model statute that would automatically seal records of 
non-violent misdemeanors after ten years. See COMMUNITY LEGAL SERVS. OF PHILA., ANNUAL 
REPORT 2015 17, https://clsphila.org/sites/default/files/annual-reports/2015_CLS_AR.pdf 
(last visited on Nov. 5, 2016).  Though Pennsylvania’s legislature did not ultimately enact the 
automatic sealing bill, it did recently pass a law allowing people with certain misdemeanor 
convictions to petition to have those records sealed, but only if they have not been arrested or 
prosecuted for ten years since the later of the relevant conviction or release from supervision.  
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122.1 (2016). 
131  See COMMUNITY LEGAL SERVS. OF PHILA., supra note 130, at 17. 
132  Id. 
133  The March 2016 survey of law school clinical programs is on file with the authors.  Of 
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deliver a wide range of legal services, including record clearing and  
assistance with other collateral consequences of criminal records.134  Like the 
civil legal aid programs, this figure likely undercounts the field, as new  
clinics are opening and other clinics may provide record clearing services 
without identifying them as such.  An example of one of the early law school 
record clearing clinics is the East Bay Community Law Center’s Clean Slate 
Clinic, which we describe in more detail in Part III. 
C. FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR RECORD CLEARING INTERVENTIONS 
The federal government is supporting record clearing legal services  
directly and indirectly through a number of related and bipartisan initiatives. 
President Bush signed into law the Second Chance Act of 2007, which gives 
grants to organizations providing services to people with criminal records.135  
Since 2009, organizations in forty-nine states have received these grants.136  
In 2010, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder convened the Federal 
Interagency Reentry Council to coordinate executive branch efforts and to  
promote effective policies.137  The establishment of the council was premised 
on an acknowledgement of the collateral consequences of a criminal  
record.138  The wide range of federal agencies and offices represented in the 
council reflects both the reach of the criminal records problem and the growth 
of programs being developed to address it. 
 
all U.S. law schools surveyed (approximately 200), forty-one responded saying that they 
operate clinics that clear records or provide related criminal justice remedies. 
133  Id.  
134  Id. 
135  See Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–199, 122 Stat. 657 (2007). 
136  Second Chance Act Grant Program, THE NAT’L REENTRY RES. CTR., 
https://csgjusticecenter.org/nrrc/projects/second-chance-act/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2016). 
137  The following agencies and offices have representation in the council: the Departments 
of Justice, Interior, Agriculture, Labor, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban 
Development, Education, Commerce and Veterans Affairs, the Offices of National Drug 
Control Policy, Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships, Personnel Management, 
Management and Budget, the Social Security Administration, Domestic Policy Council, Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, Internal Revenue Service, Federal Trade 
Commission, Interagency Council on Homelessness, Small Business Administration, Court 
Services and Offender Supervision Agency, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the 
Corporation for National and Community Service. 
138  Federal Interagency Reentry Council, NAT’L REENTRY RES. CTR., 
http://csgjusticecenter.org/nrrc/projects/firc/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2016). In 2014, Attorney 
General Holder exhorted Attorneys General from every state in the nation to mitigate or 
eliminate “unnecessary collateral consequences” whenever possible. Justice News: Remarks 
as Prepared for Delivery by Attorney General Eric Holder at the National Association of 
Attorneys General Winter Meeting, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Feb. 25, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-prepared-delivery-attorney-general-eric-holder-
national-association-attorneys. 
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Federal support manifests itself principally in grants that pass through a 
variety of agencies.  The Department of Justice administers Second Chance 
Act grant funds for community organizations and specialty courts, drug 
 treatment diversion programs, substance-abuse programs, and career  
training and mentoring.139  The Department of Labor operates the Young  
Offender Reentry Demonstration Grant Program, offers employers tax  
incentives to hire people with records, and provides them with liability 
 insurance.140  The Department of Education provides states with funds to 
educate out-of-school adults, 20% of which states can dedicate to people with 
criminal records.141  The Department of Housing and Urban Development 
funds the Community Development Block Grant Program, through which 
grantees can provide housing for people with criminal records.142  Finally, 
the Department of Health and Human Services funds the Young Offender 
Reentry Program and many other programs and grants that are designed to 
help those struggling with substance abuse.143 
In 2012, the White House and U.S. Department of Justice convened the 
Legal Aid Interagency Roundtable (“LAIR”) “to raise federal agencies’ 
awareness of how civil legal aid can help advance a wide range of federal 
objectives including improved access to health and housing, education and 
employment, family stability, and community well-being.”144  According to 
LAIR’s 2014 case study, civil legal aid programs should help people with 
record clearing to improve their job prospects and other opportunities.145  In 
 
139  See JAMES, supra note 14.  
140  Id. at 19. 
141  Id. 
142  Id. 
143  Id. 
144  The Roundtable was launched to explore how civil legal aid could advance a range of 
federal objectives (including access to employment) and involved the collaboration of 
seventeen federal agencies. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WHITE HOUSE LEGAL AID INTERAGENCY 
ROUNDTABLE TOOLKIT (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/atj/legal-aid-interagency-
roundtable-toolkit.  
145  Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ACCESS TO JUST. INITIATIVE, CIVIL LEGAL AID 
SUPPORTS FEDERAL EFFORTS TO HELP PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS MAKE A SUCCESSFUL 
REENTRY (2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atj/legacy/2014/04/16/reentry-
case-study.pdf.  The case study also recommends correcting inaccurate records and working 
with employers to address discrimination against people with criminal records.  Id.  Federal 
grants that support job training and mentor programs for people with criminal records at the 
U.S. Department of Labor and U.S. Department of Justice now include civil legal aid as an 
allowable use of funds.  Id.  In early 2016, the Department of Labor posted a Request for 
Information about a contract for the implementation of an online National Clean Slate 
Clearinghouse, which would consolidate information on currently available reentry services 
and collaborate with service providers to improve their functions. Nat’l Clean Slate 
Clearinghouse, FED. BUS. OPPORTUNITIES (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.fbo.gov/index?s= 
opportunity&mode=form&id=5fe5279b511aac5d4de962cc1c243f85&tab=core&_cview=0. 
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February 2016, the LAIR released a report summarizing the results of a two-
day workshop on civil legal aid.146  Among a number of research priorities, 
the report recommended funding for studies of “the consequences of sealing 
or expunging criminal records,” including “whether expungement improves 
employment outcomes.”147 
Record clearing remedies are generally available to the large number of 
people with records of arrests or relatively minor infractions, misdemeanors, 
and low-level felonies.  Legal services providers—public defenders, civil  
legal aid lawyers, and law school clinics—have developed a new  
subspecialty to help people with criminal records avail themselves of these 
remedies.  And the federal government is devoting time, expertise, and  
resources to the effort.  As more resources are being devoted to criminal  
record clearing, questions about its efficacy, such as the ones our study 
measures, take on greater urgency. 
In the next Part, we describe in some detail a community-based law 
school clinic as an example of a project designed to help people with criminal 
records overcome collateral consequences generally and employment  
barriers in particular.  The clinic served as the research site for this study. 
III. A CRIMINAL RECORD CLEARING CLINIC 
The East Bay Community Law Center (“EBCLC”) is a non-profit clinic 
affiliated with the UC Berkeley School of Law.148  Founded by law students 
in 1988, EBCLC has a dual teaching-service mission.  Each year, the clinic 
trains and supervises more than 100 Berkeley Law students who in turn  
provide free legal assistance to several thousand low-income residents in  
Alameda County, California.149 
Over time, EBCLC’s services have evolved from bread and butter civil 
legal aid issues like housing and welfare to a broad range of legal problems 
facing low-income community members, including health, consumer,  
 
146  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. NAT’L INST. OF JUST. & OFF. FOR ACCESS TO JUST., WHITE HOUSE 
LEGAL AID INTERAGENCY ROUNDTABLE: CIVIL LEGAL AID RESEARCH WORKSHOP REPORT 
(2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249776.pdf. 
147  Id. at 16. 
148  Current information about EBCLC is available on the organization’s website: 
http://ebclc.org/. 
149  Students launched the clinic in the 1980s to increase clinical learning opportunities at 
the Law School and to fill the gap left by the closure of the LSC-funded neighborhood legal 
aid office in Berkeley.  For published accounts of EBCLC’s history, see Angela P. Harris, 
Margaretta Lin & Jeffrey Selbin, From ‘The Art of War’ to ‘Being Peace’: Mindfulness and 
Community Lawyering in a Neoliberal Age, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2073, 2093 (2007); Jeffrey Selbin 
& Mark Del Monte, A Waiting Room of Their Own: The Family Care Network as a Model for 
Providing Gender-Specific Legal Services to Women with HIV, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 
103, 120 (1998).  
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immigration, and community economic development.  In 2001, an EBCLC 
lawyer and her students recognized the growing collateral consequences of 
mass criminalization in the client community.  They started a project to assist 
people who were cycling in and out of the criminal justice system without 
legal help.  For example, they represented homeless people charged with  
infractions and misdemeanors in traffic court. 
These early interventions revealed the need for a general record clearing 
practice, as client after client appeared to be held back from jobs and other 
opportunities based on criminal records for relatively minor offenses.  After 
piloting the provision of such services, EBCLC launched the Clean Slate 
Clinic at a 2005 public summit and record clearing event co-sponsored by 
U.S. Congresswoman Barbara Lee.  More than 900 people with criminal  
records attended the event.150  The clinic began assisting people with a range 
of record remedies, including dismissals, felony reductions, certificates of 
rehabilitation, and pardons.151  Since the 2005 launch, the clinic has trained 
more than 150 law students and served almost 10,000 clients.152 
In this Part, we describe the Clean Slate Clinic’s service goals and  
methods, the local client population, and California’s main record clearing 
remedies.153  In light of earlier descriptions of the emerging field in public 
defender programs, civil legal aid offices, and law school clinics, we discuss 
how EBCLC’s intervention model at the time of the study was generally  
representative of criminal record clearing programs. 
A. GOALS AND METHODS 
EBCLC’s Clean Slate Clinic was one of the first law school clinics to 
provide criminal record clearing legal services.  Since its formal launch in 
2005, the clinic has been animated by two distinct but related goals.  As  
described above, research confirms that people with criminal records face 
significant barriers to jobs, education, housing, and civic participation.  The 
first and primary goal of the clinic is to increase access to employment and 
other opportunities.  Our study measures the employment outcomes of the 
record clearing intervention. 
Second, the criminal justice system exacts a heavy psychosocial toll on 
 
150  Clean Slate, E. BAY CMTY. L. CTR., http://ebclc.org/about/the-work/economic-
security-opportunity/clean-slate/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2016).  
151  Clean Slate @ 10: Supporting Successful Reentry Then and Now, E. BAY CMTY. L. 
CTR., http://ebclc.org/support-us/campaigns/clean-slate-10/then-and-now/ (last visited Oct. 
23, 2016). 
152  Id. 
153  Interview with Eliza Hersh, EBCLC Clean Slate Clinic Director, in Berkeley, Cal. 
(Dec. 11, 2015) (providing much of the information in this section about the clinic). 
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participants, forcing them to undergo various forms of status degradation that 
undermine their human dignity.154  These rituals strip people’s self-esteem 
and individuality, relegating them to the status of criminals.  By providing 
record clearing services, the clinic aims to reduce the social stigma and  
psychological harms associated with involvement in the criminal justice  
system.155  This goal is the subject of a companion study not discussed further 
here.156 
To achieve these opportunity-increasing and dignity-enhancing goals, 
the clinic has developed a multi-modal service delivery model that includes 
community outreach and education, law reform litigation, and policy  
advocacy.  The clinic’s outreach and education work involves staffing  
community-based workshops and weekend events for people with criminal 
records, and training for stakeholders, such as workforce development 
partners, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies.  The clinic also 
trains other legal services providers, including public defender offices and 
community agencies.  In collaboration with partner organizations, the clinic 
engages in policy advocacy and impact litigation to expand the rights of and 
protections for people with criminal records and to reduce the collateral  
consequences of criminal records.157 
The heart of the clinic’s delivery model—which informs all other  
aspects—is direct representation of people with criminal records, which we 
describe in the following subsections. 
 
154  See Harold Garfinkle, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 AM. J. 
SOC. 420 (1956) (describing punishment as a “status degradation ceremony” that places 
criminality at the center of the punished person’s identity); Shadd Maruna, Reentry as a Rite 
of Passage, 13 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 3, 11 (2011) (theorizing that Anglo-American cultures 
are particularly bad at welcoming people who have been convicted of criminal offenses back 
into society because they lack needed reintegration rituals); see also Amy Myrick, Facing 
Your Criminal Record: Expungement and the Collateral Problem of Wrongfully Represented 
Self, 47 L. & SOC’Y 73, 102 (2013) (finding that people who encounter their criminal records 
in the record clearing process often discover that their record is a static and inaccurate 
depiction of their identities). 
155  See Maruna, supra note 154, at 14 (arguing that reintegration rituals can have the 
emotional and symbolic significance necessary to facilitate healing).  
156  In the companion study, one of the authors is measuring the status enhancing benefits 
of the record clearing intervention, with a particular focus on the role of the record clearing 
process.  Keramet Reiter et al., Redemption Song: The Qualitative Impact of Reentry Legal 
Services and Status Enhancement Rituals on People with Criminal Records (July 21, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript on file with authors). 
157  For example, the clinic has participated in campaigns to increase civic engagement for 
voters and jurors, foster juvenile reentry, and rationalize licensing requirements for people 
with criminal records.  Interview with Eliza Hersh, supra note 153.  
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B. CLIENTS AND REMEDIES 
The Clean Slate Clinic serves clients in Alameda County, California, 
which is home to more than 1.6 million people.158  The county seat and largest 
city is Oakland, and the county is one of the most racially diverse in the  
country.159  The cities and communities within Alameda County are  
heterogeneous, with pockets of great wealth and deep poverty.  In 2015, one 
in eight county residents lived in poverty, which is below the state average, 
but poorer areas of the County have disproportionately high rates of  
unemployment, especially among African-Americans.160 
Like their counterparts in communities around California and across the 
country, Alameda County residents have high rates of involvement with the 
criminal justice system.  From 2005 through 2014, an average of 33,812 
people were arrested annually for misdemeanor offenses and roughly one 
third of arrestees were African-American.161  Many people arrested for  
misdemeanors end up on informal court probation—Alameda County’s  
Probation Department estimated that about 41,000 people were on such  
probation in 2013.162  Overall, local nonprofits estimate that roughly 375,000 
Alameda County adults have a criminal record.163 
 
158 QuickFacts: Alameda County, California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/06001,00 (last visited Sept. 13, 2017).  
159  The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that in 2015, the county was 51.3% White, 29.5% 
Asian, 11.8% African-American, 1.1% American Indian and Native Alaskan, 1% Native 
Hawaiian and Pacific Islander, and 5.3% multi-racial. Id. Further, 22.6% of people identified 
as being Hispanic or Latino—a category that the Census treats as non-racial.  Id. 
160  Id.  Though the unemployment rate in Alameda County is currently down to 4.3%, it 
is much higher in poorer, largely African-American areas of the county. See Chris Roberts, 
Report: Black unemployment in Bay Area more than three times the average, EXAMINER (Mar. 
6, 2015), http://archives.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/report-black-unemployment-in-bay-
area-more-than-three-times-the-average/Content?oid=2922602 (stating that the 
unemployment rate for African-Americans in the Bay Area was 19%, which was three times 
the average unemployment rate of other races); see also Alameda County Profile, ST. OF CAL. 
EMP. DEV. DEP’T, http://www.labormarketinfo.edd.ca.gov/cgi/databrowsing/localareaprofile 
qsresults.asp?selectdarea=Alameda+County&selectedindex=1&menuchoice=localarea 
pro&state=true&geogarea=0604000001&countyname= (last visited Oct. 23, 2016); Economic 
Development & Jobs, YOUTH UPRISING, http://www.youthuprising.org/issues-
responses/economic-development-jobs/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2016) (stating that in East 
Oakland, unemployment rates exceed 50% in some areas). 
161  County Map, OPEN JUST., https://openjustice.doj.ca.gov/agencies/county-map (filtered 
by “all arrests”) (last visited Nov. 9, 2016). 
162  ALAMEDA CTY. PROB. DEP’T, ROAD TO RE-ENTRY: ALAMEDA COUNTY ADULT RE-
ENTRY STRATEGIC PLAN 10 (2014), https://www.acgov.org/probation/documents/ReEntry 
StrategicPlan-BoardApproved3-11-14.pdf. Alameda County’s Probation Department also has 
data on people who have been convicted of more serious crimes—as of July of 2013, there 
were 12,390 people on felony probation (5,270 of whom required supervision), 1,860 people 
on state parole, and 500 people on federal probation.  Id. 
163  Sam Levin, East Bay Businesses That Give Applicants a Fair Chance, E. BAY EXPRESS 
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People seeking record clearing services in the Clean Slate Clinic fall into 
several broad, overlapping categories.164  Some people have an arrest or  
conviction for a single bad moment, like petty theft, a bar fight, public  
drunkenness, or a DUI.  Some have a string of arrests and convictions related 
to substance addiction (and supporting the addiction), such as non-violent 
drug and alcohol offenses, property offenses like shoplifting, or prostitution. 
Women, in particular, might have a welfare fraud conviction for failure 
to report income or to repay an overpayment.  Young men, in particular, 
might have records with vehicle-related arrests and convictions for offenses 
like driving on a suspended license, failure to appear (on traffic tickets), or 
joyriding.  According to advocates, these convictions tend to cascade, in part 
because of the employment barriers for people with criminal records. 
In light of these community demographics and needs, the Clean Slate 
Clinic assists people seeking two kinds of record clearing remedies.  The first 
remedy is a post-conviction set-aside and dismissal for convictions that did 
not result in prison sentences.165  The second remedy is a felony reduction.166 
1. Set Aside and Dismissal 
Under the California Penal Code, people convicted of certain 
infractions, misdemeanors, or felonies that did not result in a state prison  
sentence can petition the court to set aside and dismiss the convictions.167  
Dismissal petitions fall into mandatory and discretionary categories.  The 
court must grant the dismissal petition if probation is completed (including 
payment of all fines, fees, and restitution), the petitioner is not serving  
another sentence (or on probation), and the petitioner has no charges pending 
in another case.168  Under certain circumstances, where all probation terms 
 
(June 10, 2015), http://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/east-bay-businesses-that-give-
applicants-a-fair-chance/Content?oid=4330428.  
164  Clean Slate Clinic Director Eliza Hersh provided general background information 
about the clinic’s clients. Interview with Eliza Hersh, Director of EBCLC’s Clean Slate Clinic, 
in Berkeley, Cal. (Oct. 7, 2016). 
165  Set-aside and dismissal remedies require either that no probation was imposed, that 
probation has been completed, or that early termination of probation has been obtained under 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.3.  See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203.4, 1203.4a, 1203.41 (West 2017).  
166  CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b) (West 2011).  
167  These remedies are codified in California Penal Code sections 1203.4, 1203.4a, and 
1203.41. While these sections differ slightly in eligibility requirements and impact, we will 
refer to this relief generally as dismissals. Certain misdemeanor and felony sexual offenses do 
not qualify, and neither do infractions. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203.4, 1203.4a, 1203.41 (2017).  
168  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4(a)(1); id. at § 1203.4(a) (petitioners with convictions 
who never received probation are also eligible for dismissals if: (1) the conviction is a 
misdemeanor or an infraction; (2) it has been at least one year since the date of conviction; 
and (3) the petitioner complied fully with the sentence of the court, is not currently serving 
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have not been completed, the court still has discretion to set aside and dismiss 
a conviction.169 
Although the dismissal remedy is often referred to as “expungement,” it 
does not result in the destruction of the criminal record.  Instead, the dismissal 
releases the person “from all penalties and disabilities” resulting from the 
conviction.170  The dismissal is supposed to be entered into the criminal 
record and reflected on state and federal RAP sheets, enabling the successful 
petitioner to answer “no” to an inquiry about conviction history on  
applications for most private employment.171  Some dismissals, however, will 
 
another sentence, not currently charged with another offense, and has obeyed the law and lived 
an honest and upright life since the time of conviction, or in the interests of justice); id. at 
§ 1203.41 (petitioners convicted pursuant to section 1170(h) are eligible for dismissals if: (1) 
the concluding portion of petitioner’s sentence was suspended under section 1170(h)(5); (2) it 
has been a year or two, depending on the type of felony conviction, since completion of the 
sentence; and (3) the petitioner is not currently incarcerated, under supervision, or charged 
with a new offense). 
169  CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4(a)(1) (for convictions where the petitioner received 
probation but did not get an early release, did not fulfill all the conditions of probation, and 
was not convicted of any offense listed in the Vehicle Code sections 12810(a)–(e), but: (1) 
paid all the fines, restitution, and reimbursements ordered by the court as part of the sentence; 
and (2) is not currently charged with, on probation for, or serving a sentence for any other 
offense). 
170  Id.  However, California legislators and courts have limited the scope of this release 
from disabilities.  See CAL. EVID. CODE § 788(c) (West 2005) (mandating that dismissal of a 
conviction under section 1203.4 does not prevent a defendant from being impeached with the 
conviction if he takes the stand in his own defense in a subsequent criminal trial); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 290.007 (West 2012) (stating that a dismissal under § 1203.4 does not eliminate the 
requirement to register for a sex offense); id. at § 299(f) (requiring a person found guilty of a 
qualifying offense to provide specimens, samples, or prints even if the offense was dismissed 
under 1203.4); CAL. VEH. CODE § 13555 (West 2017) (providing that dismissal under 1203.4 
does not affect any revocation or suspension of driver’s privileges); Brownrigg v. U.S. 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 356 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1966) (holding that a 
conviction under 1203.4 does not prohibit the federal government from examining the 
conviction for immigration purposes); People v. Frawley, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 555, 559–60 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2000) (explaining that a dismissal “does not, properly speaking, ‘expunge’ the prior 
conviction . . .” and that the relief a dismissal provides has substantial limits, as it cannot 
prevent the “dismissed” crime from being used as a prior conviction, relieve the beneficiary 
of the obligation to disclose the dismissed conviction in an application for a professional 
license, or reinstate the right to possess firearms); People v. Diaz, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 252, 255 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a conviction dismissed under 1203.4 could still be 
considered a “strike”); People v. Majado, 70 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937) 
(holding that a 1203.4 expungement does not prevent the use of a prior conviction from being 
admitted as a “similar” offense in subsequent prosecution).  
171  Danielle Jones, When the Fallout of Criminal Conviction Goes Too Far: Challenging 
Collateral Consequences, 11 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 237, 255 (2015).  The right to say no is not 
in the statute; the California Labor Code forbids an employer from asking about a dismissed 
conviction, with exceptions for a number of public positions.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7 (West 
2017).  The California Penal Code specifies the conditions under which dismissed convictions 
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show up in subsequent prosecutions and must be disclosed on a questionnaire 
in an application for licensure or public office.172  Because more than 20% of 
California’s 19 million workers require a license—and California has  
particularly onerous licensing requirements for jobs typically held by people 
of modest means173—the dismissal remedy on its face does not eliminate 
barriers to all forms of employment. 
2. Felony Reduction 
Under California Penal Code section 17(b), people convicted of certain 
felonies and not sentenced to state prison may be eligible to reduce the felony 
to a misdemeanor.174  Felony reduction applies only to convictions for crimes 
that could have been charged as either a felony or a misdemeanor and only if 
all felony charges in the same case are eligible.175  Factors the judge considers 
in granting felony reductions include the nature and seriousness of the  
offense, the defendant’s attitude toward the crime that has been committed, 
 
must still be disclosed, including “in response to any direct question contained in any 
questionnaire or application for public office, for licensure by any state or local agency, or for 
contracting with the California State Lottery Commission.”  CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4(a)(1).  
Under the legal principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, people are not required to 
disclose dismissed convictions to private employers.  See People v. Arata, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
160, 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that dismissal under 1203.4 allows a defendant to 
“truthfully represent to friends, acquaintances and private sector employers that he has no 
conviction” (quoting People v. Acuna, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 224, 227 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000))). 
172  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4(a)(1).  Dismissals under § 1203.4 also do not exempt 
people required by law to register as sex offenders from doing so. People v. Hamdon, 171 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 95, 100 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that the sex registration requirement was not a 
penalty or disability under 1203.4 because the primary purpose of the requirement was to 
ensure public safety).  Dismissals under 1203.4 also do not, in general, undo the consequences 
of conviction for the purpose of immigration proceedings.  Ramirez-Castro v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv., 287 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the general rule is 
that state law expungements do not affect the immigration consequences of a conviction).  But 
see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 480(c) (West 2015) (mandating, after recent amendment, that 
a licensing board may not deny a person a license “solely on the basis of a conviction that has 
been dismissed pursuant to Section 1203.4, 1203.4a, or 1203.41 of the Penal Code.”). 
173  See generally Morris M. Kleiner, Reforming Occupational Licensing Policies, 
HAMILTON PROJECT 9 (Jan. 2015), available at http://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/ 
reforming_occupational_licensing_policies. Although California does not have as high a 
percentage of workers in licensed professions as many other states, it is the third most 
restrictive state behind only Louisiana and Arizona in licensing requirements “for occupations 
traditionally entered into by people of modest means . . . defined by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics as making less than the national average income.” LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, JOBS 
FOR CALIFORNIANS: STRATEGIES TO EASE OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING BARRIERS 15–16 (Oct. 
2016), http://www.lhc.ca.gov/sites/lhc.ca.gov/files/Reports/234/Report234.pdf.  
174  CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b), § 19.8. 
175  Id. at § 17(b). 
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and his or her behavior during the trial.176 
Felony reductions are an important remedy for a couple of reasons.  
Because some employers ask only about felony convictions, the reduction to 
a misdemeanor allows a person to answer “no” when asked about such  
convictions even if they have not obtained full dismissal of the conviction.177  
A felony reduction can also restore an individual’s right to serve on a jury 
and to possess a firearm.178 
Despite these benefits, the felony reduction remedy is also limited in 
important ways.  A felony reduction is not retroactive and does not mitigate 
all of the collateral consequences of the newly created misdemeanor record.  
Some licensing laws expressly limit the impact of felony reduction. Further, 
despite the reduction, the physical record of the original designation of a  
felony conviction is not expunged or erased from court and law enforcement 
records.  Rather, the reduction or reclassification is listed along with the  
felony as a subsequent disposition. 
C. RECORD CLEARING PROCESS 
To seek the record clearing remedies described above, legal service  
providers generally obtain a client’s RAP sheet, which should be a complete 
record of adult involvement in the criminal justice system.  Advocates review 
RAP sheets for accuracy and jurisdiction and to check eligibility for a 
dismissal, felony reduction, or other record clearing remedy.  Next, they  
prepare a formal petition for all eligible remedies.179  In addition to the  
petition, advocates advise and assist the client to obtain supporting  
documentation in the form of letters, declarations, and other testimonials, or 
evidence demonstrating rehabilitation and the need for the requested relief.  
As needed, advocates represent petitioners in court to pursue available  
 
176  People v. Superior Court, 928 P.2d 1171, 1176 (Cal. 1997). 
177  Jones, supra note 171, at 255. 
178  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b) (stating that when a crime meets all of the relevant 
conditions, it is a misdemeanor “for all purposes”); id. at § 203(a)(5) (excluding people 
convicted of felonies from serving as trial jurors unless their civil rights have been restored); 
id. at § 29800 (making it a felony offense to own, purchase, receive, or possess a firearm after 
one has been convicted of a felony).  
179  For dismissal of records under Penal Code sections 1203.4, 1203.4a, and felony 
reductions under Penal Code section 17b, the form is “CR-180,” available at 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/cr180.pdf. The Clean Slate Clinic occasionally serves 
clients with convictions eligible for dismissal or reduction even if they have other convictions 
that are not eligible for relief. This typically happens if clients have newer convictions eligible 
for relief and older convictions that are ineligible for relief but which should not be reported 
to employers because they occurred more than seven years ago. E-mail from Eliza Hersh, Dir. 
of EBCLC’s Clean Slate Clinic, to Jeffrey Selbin, Clinical Professor of Law, UC Berkeley 
School of Law (Jan. 30, 2017) (on file with author). 
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remedies. 
While record clearing programs vary across states and within  
jurisdictions, EBCLC’s Clean Slate Clinic is a fairly representative example 
of the growing field in public defender offices, civil legal aid programs, and 
law school clinics.  Like the San Francisco Public Defender’s Office and 
Community Legal Services of Philadelphia described above, the Clean Slate 
Clinic is a high volume provider that focuses services on people who are  
disproportionately impacted by criminal records.  And like the others, the 
clinic helps clients avail themselves of core record clearing remedies. 
The Clean Slate Clinic, therefore, was an appropriate setting in which to 
study the record clearing intervention.  In fact, there is a growing movement 
to evaluate outcomes in civil legal aid programs, where client demand far 
outstrips scarce resources, and providers and funders need better data to make 
key resource allocation decisions.180  Law school clinics affiliated with  
research universities are obvious sites of inquiry with access to the requisite 
expertise to mount meaningful research protocols.181 
In the next Part, we describe our study, including its method, population 
sample, and limits. 
IV. A CRIMINAL RECORD CLEARING STUDY 
As described above, tens of millions of American adults have a criminal 
record of arrest or prosecution, mostly for relatively minor offenses.  These 
records serve as barriers to a range of benefits and opportunities, especially 
in the labor market.  Record clearing programs like the East Bay Community 
Law Center’s Clean Slate Clinic are designed to improve employment  
outcomes for people with criminal records, but we know surprisingly little 
about if, how, and for whom these interventions deliver on their promise. 
Some record clearing programs have conducted outcome evaluations.182  
 
180 Jeanne Charn, Celebrating the “Null” Finding: Evidence-Based Strategies for 
Improving Access to Legal Services, 122 YALE L.J. 2206, 2232–34 (2013); Jeffrey Selbin et 
al., Service Delivery, Resource Allocation and Access to Justice: Greiner and Pattanayak and 
the Research Imperative, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 45, 54–61 (2012) [hereinafter Selbin et al., 
Resource Allocation and Access to Justice]; Jeffrey Selbin et al., Access to Evidence: How an 
Evidence-Based Delivery System Can Improve Legal Aid for Low- and Moderate-Income 
Americans, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS  (2011), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/civil-
liberties/report/2011/06/22/9707/access-to-evidence/.  
181  Jeanne Charn & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Lab Office, 2013 WISC. L. REV. 145, 162 
(2013); Jeffrey Selbin & Jeanne Charn, Legal Aid, Law School Clinics and the Opportunity 
for Joint Gain, MGMT. INFO. EXCH. J. 28, 29–31 (2007).  
182  For example, an outside review of the San Francisco Public Defender Office’s Clean 
Slate Program found that 90% of clients’ petitions (mostly dismissals and felony reductions) 
were granted, removing “significant barriers for Clean Slate clients to employment, housing, 
public benefits, civic participation, immigration, and the attainment of other social, legal, and 
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EBCLC, for example, evaluates its Clean Slate Clinic through a variety of 
methods, including client satisfaction surveys and client focus groups.183  
While record clearing programs appear to be providing important services to 
their clients, the research to date does not tell us much about the relationship 
between the intervention and employment outcomes.184 
Our study attempts to help fill this void.  We measured Clean Slate 
Clinic participants’ average employment rates and earnings reported to the 
Social Security Administration before and after record clearing, using a well-
established method frequently deployed to study the effect of job-training 
programs on employment outcomes.185  By doing so, we hoped to answer 
some basic questions about the impact of the record clearing intervention on 
employment outcomes. 
In this Part, we describe our research design, which is observational in 
nature and compares early adopters of the record clearing intervention to late 
adopters.  We also describe our sample subjects, our data source, and the 
limits of our method, population, and data. 
A. METHOD 
The goal in studying the effect of a program intervention is to measure 
the difference between two otherwise identical people: one who participates 
in the intervention and one who does not.  Our study is retrospective and 
observational, using a timeframe research design—in this case, early 
 
personal goals.”  LFA GRP., CLEAN SLATE PROGRAM OFF. OF THE PUB. DEFENDER CITY & 
COUNTY OF S.F., 2007–2008 EVALUATION FINDINGS 6 (2009), http://sfpublicdefender.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2009/05/clean-slate-evaluation-final-report.pdf. A Stanford cost-
benefit analysis of a record clearing program in Santa Clara County found that former clients 
who received a dismissal reported to the provider an increase in annual income of $6,190. 
MEYLI CHAPIN ET AL., A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL RECORD EXPUNGEMENT IN 
SANTA CLARA COUNTY 23 (March 2014), available at https://publicpolicy.stanford.edu/ 
publications/cost-benefit-analysis-criminal-record-expungement-santa-clara-county. 
183  A review of several hundred survey forms and three focus group reports reveals a high 
level of client satisfaction with both the service and outcomes.  See Reiter et al., supra note 
156.  
184  The San Francisco Public Defender Office study equates a successful process outcome 
(a petition granted) with the desired outcome measure (removing barriers to employment and 
other opportunities).  LFA GRP., supra note 182. The Stanford Santa Clara study does not 
control for key variables, including selection effects, which makes it impossible to draw a 
causal inference between the intervention and the reported outcome.  CHAPIN ET AL., supra 
note 182. EBCLC’s program evaluation focuses primarily on client satisfaction. See Reiter et 
al., supra note 156. 
185  See Orley Ashenfelter, Estimating the Effect of Training Programs on Earnings, 60 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 47, 48 (1978) (a study using Social Security Administration (“SSA”) data 
to determine the effect of job training programs on earnings, assuming that the SSA’s data are 
an accurate reflection of earning potential over time, but noting that the records are capped at 
the Social Security taxable maximum, a fact that is less relevant for low-income workers). 
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adopters versus late adopters—to measure the impact of the Clean Slate 
Clinic’s record clearing intervention on employment outcomes.  For reasons 
described in more detail in Appendix A, we did not use other methods, such 
as a randomized controlled trial or a match group, which have different 
strengths and weaknesses than our approach. 
Our early-versus-late adopters approach makes comparisons between 
groups of participants that are organized according to when they began the 
intervention.  If the intervention has an effect, then the effect should appear 
in the order in which the intervention was received.  Thus, a group that has 
yet to begin the intervention can serve as a comparison group for the group 
that has already begun the intervention. 
As compared with other methodologies drawing upon other types of 
comparison groups, our approach has two important advantages.  First, the 
employment outcomes are uniform—our comparison groups are all  
eventually served and we have participants’ social security numbers, so we 
can measure their average employment rates and earnings in an apples-to-
apples way.  This alleviates some of our concerns about internal validity.  
Second, the participants come from a common economic environment and 
are otherwise similarly situated (except for the date they sought the  
intervention).  This alleviates some concerns about external validity. 
However, to measure the effect of the intervention using this model, we 
must account for pre-intervention differences between the people in the  
temporally divided groups.  In order to do this, we use pre-intervention data 
on the outcomes that the study will measure (in our case, employment rates 
and average earnings).  Any differences in these measures between the  
temporally divided groups before the intervention takes place are attributable 
to selection bias and cannot logically be attributed to the intervention  
(because it has not yet occurred). 
Having established the average differences between the groups of  
participants prior to the intervention, this method assumes that these  
differences remain constant (or time-invariant).  The impact of the  
intervention can then be measured by taking the difference between the 
change in the first group’s employment rates and earnings before and after 
the intervention and the change over the same period in any of the  
comparison groups’ employment rates and earnings, which have not yet been 
affected by the intervention.  This method, which is sometimes called  
“difference-in-differences,”186 effectively extracts the effects of pre-study 
differences between participants, thus leaving the impact of the intervention. 
 
186  See generally James Heckman et al., Sources of Selection Bias in Evaluating Social 
Programs: An Interpretation of Conventional Measures and Evidence on the Effectiveness of 
Matching as a Program Evaluation Method, 93 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 13416 (1996).  
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For more detail on our method, validity, hypotheses and modeling about 
how the record clearing intervention might impact employment rates and 
earnings, see Appendix B. 
B. SAMPLE 
We drew our sample from clients served by the East Bay Community 
Law Center’s Clean Slate Clinic.  The clinic serves 1,000 or more clients a 
year with a variety of criminal record clearing matters.  For individual  
participants (clients), the clinic provides assistance, including referrals,  
counsel and advice, brief service, and full representation.  In consultation 
with Clean Slate Clinic lawyers, we had to make choices about which case 
types and forms of intervention to include in our study. 
The subjects in our study represent a random sample of just over 10% 
(264/2,575) of the people who received legal assistance in the clinic during 
the twenty-four-month period from July 1, 2007 through June 30, 2009.187  
Participants were eligible for inclusion in the subject pool if they received 
representation from the clinic—not just a referral or counsel and advice—to 
obtain at least one of the principal California record clearing remedies  
described above (the dismissal of a criminal record and/or a felony  
reduction).  Working with EBCLC staff, we obtained basic client  
demographic data on the total pool of eligible clients and the sample group 
from an electronic case management system and paper case files.188 
From the batch of 264 clients, we requested aggregate, anonymized,  
annual employment rate and earnings data from the Social Security  
Administration Office of Research, Evaluation, and Statistics (“SSA”).  We 
received such data for 235 people, including 147 men and eighty-eight 
women.  We did not receive data for the twenty-nine clients whose social 
security numbers and dates of birth did not match the SSA records.  The SSA 
data cover a period that begins in 2000, well before the record clearing  
intervention, and ends in 2011, two to four years after the intervention.189 
 
187  The research protocol was reviewed and approved by the University of California, 
Berkeley Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects. 
188  We identified an initial sample of 364 participants, or roughly one in eight participants 
during the two-year period. We selected clients served within the time period by relative 
prevalence of their last name, beginning with each letter of the alphabet. This weighted 
randomization procedure accorded with EBCLC’s practice of keeping files alphabetized by 
last initial for each year. We did not initially exclude participants based on the presence or 
absence of a social security number in the file. However, after reviewing the paper files of the 
364 participants in the original sample, we reduced our sample to the 264 clients who had 
sufficient identifying information to obtain employment rate and earnings data from the Social 
Security Administration (a single social security number and date of birth). 
189  As noted above, we are awaiting updated data through 2015 from the SSA. 
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Table 1 displays statistics for the four cohorts we studied. 
 
Table 1. Statistics by Cohort Sample 
Notes: Statistics based on SSA data. Average real earnings deflated using Bay Area CPI-U from BLS. 
Denominator for average real earnings is all participants (not only those with positive earnings). Fraction 
employed is the percent of participants with positive earnings. 
The first cohort was served in the second half of 2007 (July 1 to  
December 31, 2007), the second cohort was served in the first half of 2008 
(January 1 to June 30, 2008), the third cohort was served in the second half 
of 2008 (July 1 to December 31, 2008), and the fourth cohort was served in 
the first half of 2009 (January 1 to June 30, 2009).  The cohorts range in size 
from twenty-eight participants (Cohort 1) to eighty-five participants (Cohort 
2). 
The four cohorts are somewhat heterogeneous with respect to time-
invariant (constant) characteristics.  The fraction of the cohort that is female 
ranges from a quarter (Cohort 3) to just over a half (Cohort 4), with an  
average across the cohorts of 37%.  Average age also varies across cohort 
from thirty-eight years (Cohort 2) to forty-three years (Cohort 4), but  
averages just over forty years.  Although we know that 57% of the clients in 
our original sample were African-American, our cohort sizes were too small 
to obtain race and ethnicity from SSA while adhering to its requirements of 
anonymized data.190 
Clean Slate participants are working—two-thirds to three-quarters are 
employed in the formal sector—but they have very low average earnings, 
generally around $18,000 in 2015 dollars (adjusted for inflation across the 
entire study period).191  This measure of formal earnings is an average across 
 
190  The quality of SSA’s race and ethnicity data is notoriously unreliable for a variety of 
reasons. See Patricia P. Martin, Why Researchers Now Rely on Surveys for Race Data on 
OASDI and SSI Programs: A Comparison of Four Major Surveys, SOC. SEC. OFF. OF RET. & 
DISABILITY POL’Y (Jan. 2016), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/rsnotes/rsn2016-01.html. 
191  SSA earnings data are nominal (not adjusted for inflation). To compare changes over 
time, we convert nominal earnings to real earnings (adjusted for inflation) using data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics on the Consumer Price Index—All Urban Consumers for San 
Francisco-Oakland-San Jose. This is the narrowest geography for which information on price 
  Timing of  Fraction    Average Fraction Employed Average Real Earnings 
Cohort    Service   N  Female     Age  2000-06 2007-11 2000-06 2007-11 
   1    2007h2   28     0.43    40.2   0.75   0.69 $16,738 $15,064 
   2    2008h1   85     0.33    38.6   0.76   0.74   22,106    18,875 
   3    2008h2   55     0.25    41.2   0.75   0.67   15,428    14,042 
   4    2009h1   67     0.51    43.6   0.76   0.69   20,427    15,335 
 All   235     0.37     40.8   0.75     0.70 $19,425  $16,280   
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all program participants—even those with zero earnings.  The purpose of  
using this type of average, as opposed to one limited to the subset of those 
working, is that one potential mechanism by which the record clearing  
intervention might improve labor market outcomes for participants is by  
increasing their chances of formal employment.  In such a context, average 
earnings across all program participants is the cleanest measure of labor  
market success. 
The average employment rates and earnings mask some variation across 
cohorts and time, as the numbers in Table 1 show.  The fraction employed—
here measured as the fraction of participants with positive formal earnings—
was 75% or 76% for each cohort in the 2000-2006 period.  In the 2007-2011 
period, the fraction employed was down five percentage points on average 
across cohorts to around 70%, with variations ranging from 67% in Cohort 3 
to 74% in Cohort 2. 
In terms of earnings, Cohorts 1 and 3 have lower averages than Cohorts 
2 and 4, closer to $15,000 than $20,000.  Not surprisingly, average earnings 
in all cohorts were higher in years before the great recession than after.  
Across cohorts, average earnings in 2000-2006 were over $19,000 and fell to 
just over $16,000 in 2007-2011. 
Figures 1A and 1B explore the temporal dimension of these patterns in 
greater detail, contrasting our sample of participants with labor market  
outcomes for Alameda County more generally.192 
Figure 1A presents the time series of employment to population ratios, 
or the ratio of people working to the total population, for our sample of Clean 
Slate participants and for Alameda County as a whole. 
 
levels is available. All figures cited in the paper are in 2015 dollars. Consumer Price Index, 
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., http://www.bls.gov/cpi/ (last visited Oct. 9, 
2017).  
192  In Figures 1A and 1B, we use the population of those aged eighteen to sixty-five, even 
though many of those people are not in the labor force.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486867 
SELBIN 1/25/18  11:13 AM 
2017] UNMARKED? 43 
 
The level of employment (measured as fraction employed) in our  
sample is similar to that of the general population and the overall trajectories 
of those levels are also highly similar.  That may be prior grounds for  
suspecting that the levels and trends would be dissimilar—after all, Clean 
Slate participants self-select a treatment indicating an interest in work  
(although they struggle to obtain it), while it is possible that Alameda County 
residents as a whole are less interested in work (yet may have an easier time 
obtaining it).  Nonetheless, the year-to-year fluctuations in the two series are 
very similar.193 
Figure 1B presents the time series of average real earnings. 
 
193  The time series correlation of the two is over 0.90. In the interest of transparency, 
Appendix Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix C provide a graphical display of the raw data on 
employment rates and earnings that we obtained from the SSA. These data are a time series 
for each of the Clean Slate cohorts. 
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Each solid circle is the weighted average of real earnings across the four 
cohorts, with weights equal to the size of the cohort.  In the wake of the early 
2000s recession, participant earnings fell about $2,000 in 2015 dollars, from 
roughly $20,000 to $18,000. Earnings increased over $4,000 leading up to 
the great recession, but plummeted from 2006 to 2009, falling from over 
$22,000 to just over $14,000, before rebounding slightly in 2010 and 2011. 
While average real earnings for our sample of participants are extremely 
low relative to all residents of Alameda County, the trends are generally  
similar.194  The earnings levels are so different that placing the two series on 
the same axis would mask fluctuation over time, so we present our sample of 
Clean Slate participants on the left-hand y-axis and Alameda County  
residents on the right-hand y-axis.  Earnings for Alameda County residents 
in 2000 were roughly $48,000 in 2015 dollars, suggesting that the earnings 
power of Clean Slate participants is about 40 percent of the earnings of all 
 
194  To obtain a measure of earnings akin to average real earnings based on SSA data, we 
use Bureau of Labor Statistics data drawn from the Quarterly Census of Employment and 
Wages (QCEW) program. This program covers approximately 98% of formal sector earnings 
and, like the SSA data, is based off of W2 forms filed by individuals and employers. We take 
total earnings from the QCEW for Alameda County (the most granular geography 
corresponding to EBCLC) and normalize it by estimated population ages eighteen to sixty-
five. We do so using straight line interpolation between total population on Census Day 2000 
and 2010, further discounted by the 25% and 10% of Alameda that was below age eighteen 
and above age sixty-five, respectively. Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., http://www.bls.gov/cew/ (last visited Oct. 9, 
2017). 
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residents.195 
Presenting the data this way allows us to see that the earnings power of 
Alameda County residents and of Clean Slate participants exhibit similar  
patterns over time.196  But in the wake of the great recession, real earnings 
outcomes for Clean Slate participants worsened much more rapidly and 
sharply than earnings for all county residents, underscoring the fragile labor 
market for workers with criminal records.  Clean Slate participants and 
county residents experienced a small improvement in the labor market in 
2010 and 2011. 
C. LIMITS 
As described above, the early-versus-late adopters study design is a 
standard econometric methodology used to analyze non-randomized  
programs.197  We use the design here because of our interest in labor market 
outcomes for people with criminal records.  But we also are taking advantage 
of access to client information through a law school-affiliated, community-
based clinic and the availability of SSA earnings and employment rate data.  
Nevertheless, we make several assumptions that influence our findings. 
First, the study methodology is observational rather than experimental, 
meaning that the underlying model has the potential to affect the substantive 
conclusions.  In particular, one key modelling assumption allowing for  
unbiased estimation of program effects is that, controlling for the influences 
of the overall Bay Area economy, the date on which EBCLC clients avail 
themselves of EBCLC services is random.  This assumption can be  
understood as implying that, conditional on other controls, simple knowledge 
of the date clients arrive at EBCLC tells us nothing about their future  
employment rates and earnings.  As we discuss below, our findings are  
somewhat at odds with this assumption and are more consistent with what is 
known in the labor economics literature as an “Ashenfelter dip.”198 
Second, we assume that EBCLC’s intervention at the time was broadly 
representative of other record clearing programs in the field.  We have  
described above why we think this assumption is a reasonable one, but the 
Clean Slate Clinic could be different in any number of ways from other  
programs.  The active participation of student advocates may impact 
 
195  Because Clean Slate participants are substantially more likely to be in the labor market 
than all Alameda residents aged eighteen to sixty-five, their average real earnings are in reality 
even lower than 40% of the real earnings of all County residents. 
196  The time series correlation of the two is just below 0.81. 
197  See Louis S. Jacobson et al., Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, 83 AM. ECON. 
REV. 685, 692–95 (1993). 
198  See generally Ashenfelter, supra note 185, infra note 246, and accompanying text.  
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outcomes (for better or worse), though this would presumably be true in other 
clinical programs (but perhaps not in public defender and civil legal aid  
offices).199  Choices about which clients to serve and the scope of services to 
provide introduce a range of selection effects on the provider side that are 
difficult to control for and generalize about. 
In addition, record clearing and fair hiring laws vary considerably by 
state.  Even within jurisdictions, their application can differ by courthouse 
and judge.  We also have no way of knowing whether the intervention is more 
or less effective in a rising or falling labor market, much less how it operates 
relative to different local hiring practices. 
In the next Part, we describe our findings and consider their implications 
for policy and research. 
V. FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Our research design takes advantage of the staggered timing of the 
Clean Slate Clinic intervention to measure its effects on participants’ average 
employment rates and real earnings.  Though the study has limits, described 
above, we found that: (1) the record clearing intervention appears to boost 
both average employment rates and real earnings, though the durability of 
these increases is not yet known; and (2) participants sought the record 
clearing remedy after a period of suppressed earnings, in spite of relatively 
active and stable employment rates. 
In this Part, we review the findings in more detail, and we discuss their 
implications for record clearing policy and research. 
A. FINDINGS 
As previously noted, there is some heterogeneity in our sample. For  
example, different cohorts of Clean Slate participants have different gender 
composition and different employment rates, earnings, and trajectories.  
There is also substantial variation in labor market outcomes over time, and 
these year-to-year changes are not necessarily common to all cohorts.  
Because Clean Slate participants receive services at different times, however, 
 
199  See D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in 
Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) 
Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2124 (2012) (considering the role of student advocates in finding 
that a law school clinic’s offer of representation to claimants in unemployment insurance 
appeals hearings had no statistically significant impact on the chance that claimants would 
prevail in their appeals, although such offers did delay proceedings); Sponsor Preferences, 
EQUAL JUST. WORKS, http://www.equaljusticeworks.org/post-grad/equal-justice-works-
fellowships/apply/sponsorship (last visited Sept. 20, 2017). Record clearing programs in some 
public defender offices are staffed by paralegals and law student interns, and the Equal Justice 
Works record clearing fellowship program is staffed with recent law graduates.  
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temporal differences and program effects are distinguishable.200 
We observed four cohorts for a dozen years, 2000 to 2011 inclusive and 
so had forty-eight data points corresponding to our 235 Clean Slate Clinic 
participants.  The econometric method we employed was a weighted 
multivariate regression that sought to apportion explanatory credit among 
time-invariant cohort differences (fixed characteristics of the participants 
unrelated to the intervention), cohort-invariant time differences (changes in 
the larger economy), and program effects (the impact of the record clearing 
intervention on employment outcomes).  In equation form, the specific 
regression model we employed can be written as: 
 
Equation 1 
 𝑌"# = 𝜇" + 𝜆# + 𝜃)𝐷"#)+),-. + 𝜀"#  
 
The regression uses weights proportional to cohort size, which is  
appropriate for this context.  Using a weighted regression replicates what 
would be obtained from an individual-level regression in which we imputed 
to that individual the cohort-specific outcome.  We explain the regression 
model in more detail in Appendix D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
200  See generally Jacobson et al., supra note 197, at 692–95.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486867 
SELBIN 1/25/18  11:13 AM 
48 SELBIN, MCCRARY & EPSTEIN [Vol. 108 
1.  Average Employment Rates 
Figure 2A presents program effects for participant employment rates 
(positive earnings). 
 
The x-axis is labeled “Years Since Clean Slate Intervention,” with 0 
representing the year of intervention (and corresponding to the j index).  The 
y-axis is labeled “Estimated Effect” and gives the percentage rate of  
employment (positive earnings) of the estimated program effects, with 0  
representing the baseline employment rate.201  As a reminder, the SSA data 
allow us to observe the number of individuals with positive formal sector 
earnings.  Our measure of the employment rate is simply the ratio of 
 individuals with positive earnings to all individuals in the cohort. 
The results in Figure 2A show that in the years leading up to Clean Slate 
treatment, there is a somewhat lower rate of employment than at baseline.  
This effect is strongest four and five years before treatment and is essentially 
zero in the three years just before treatment.  Putting this result together with 
the low average real earnings from Figure 2B below, it appears as though 
participants are working at roughly the same rate but are losing earning 
power.  This likely reflects nominal wage cuts, or perhaps challenges with 
obtaining enough hours, because the average real earnings effects are simply 
too large to reflect inflation. 
Notably, in the years after Clean Slate treatment, the employment rate 
is generally above baseline.  The effects are economically large, roughly five 
 
201  Our method for establishing the baseline employment rate is described in Appendix D. 
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to ten percentage points.  To be concrete about the size of the effect, refer 
back to Table 1 and recall that our study population has an employment rate 
of about 75%.  The estimates in Figure 2A suggest that the Clean Slate 
intervention increases employment from the 75% baseline to 80% or 85%. 
2. Average Real Earnings 
Figure 2B is analogous to Figure 2A, but Figure 2B provides a graphical 
presentation of the estimated program effects (𝜃) in Equation 1) for  
participant average real earnings. 
 
The x-axis is labeled “Years Since Clean Slate Intervention,” with 0  
representing the year of intervention (and corresponding to the j index).  The 
y-axis is labeled “Estimated Effect” and gives the actual dollar value of the 
estimated program effects, with 0 representing baseline earnings.202  As a  
reminder, our measure of average real earnings is best thought of as total 
formal sector earnings for the cohort, relative to all individuals in the cohort.  
It is not average real earnings for the subset of the cohort that is working in 
the formal sector. 
While our sample size does not allow for precise estimation, Figure 2B 
reveals several interesting patterns.  First, in the years leading up to Clean 
Slate intervention, average real earnings are low relative to baseline earnings.  
The magnitude of the shortfall is quite large in economic terms—roughly 
 
202  Again, our method for establishing baseline earnings is described in Appendix D. 
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$4,000, or about a fifth of typical earnings in this sample, which is an already 
meager $18,000 or so (but cf., Table 1). 
Second, average real earnings tick up slightly in the year of treatment 
and then grow rapidly.  By three years after treatment, earnings have risen 
from $4,000 below baseline to nearly $2,000 above baseline.  The size of this 
swing—nearly $6,000—is a very large magnitude, roughly a third of total 
average earnings. 
These results are consistent with a simple theory of program  
participation and impact.  The first component of this theory has to do with 
the low earnings relative to baseline in the years prior to Clean Slate  
treatment.  Our theory is that the challenging labor market for people with 
criminal records motivates them to seek help in clearing their record.  The 
second component of this theory has to do with the high earnings relative to 
baseline in the years subsequent to Clean Slate treatment.  Our theory is that 
the Clean Slate intervention helped improve labor market outcomes for  
participants. 
The intervention theory is not the only theory that is consistent with 
these findings.  Although it seems implausible in the light of the employment 
rate data, depressed earnings in the years leading up to the intervention could 
mean that individuals chose to drop out of the labor force in anticipation of 
participating in Clean Slate.  Or perhaps the Clean Slate intervention simply 
coincides with other activities or attributes.  Under this account, the high 
earnings relative to baseline in the years subsequent to the Clean Slate  
intervention have little to do with the record clearing itself and instead reflect 
the positive effects of the motivation and organization that leads individuals 
to seek the intervention in the first place.203 
We note a couple of interesting differences between the findings on 
employment rates and earnings.  First, while Figure 2A shows a large 
increase in the employment rate in the year of the Clean Slate intervention—
about 6.5 percentage points—Figure 2B shows a very small effect on average 
real earnings in the same year.  These effect sizes suggest that those working 
are seeing declines in average real earnings the year of the Clean Slate  
intervention, while previously non-working participants are newly able to 
find work.  It is also possible that the employment rate effects in the year of 
the Clean Slate intervention are primarily due to individuals gaining  
employment late in the calendar year—captured as positive SSA earnings (an 
on/off switch)—while the average earnings increase associated with  
employment over time does not reveal itself until the calendar year after 
 
203  In Appendix D, we discuss research designs that might allow one to distinguish these 
different accounts. 
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Clean Slate intervention.  We cannot know for sure what explains the  
differences, but the employment rate increase precedes the earnings increase. 
The effects on employment rates and average earnings three years after 
the intervention also show some differences.  Figure 2A indicates that  
average employment rates are beginning to fall at that point relative to where 
they were one and two years out, while Figure 2B indicates that average real 
earnings are higher three years after intervention than at baseline by almost 
$2,000.  These results might indicate that the Clean Slate intervention has 
short-term labor market effects that fade over time.  However, we are not 
confident that strong interpretation on these effects is warranted at this point. 
To summarize these findings, Clean Slate Clinic participants experience 
a significant (if imprecise) increase in average employment rates (Figure 2A) 
and average real earnings (Figure 2B) immediately following the record 
clearing intervention, with employment rates declining three years out  
(Figure 2A) for unknown reasons.  Clean Slate Clinic participants experience 
a period of suppressed earnings relative to their baseline in the years  
immediately preceding the record clearing intervention (Figure 2B) in spite 
of relatively active employment (Figure 2A).  This is consistent with findings 
from the job training literature about an earnings dip prior to program  
participation.204 
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The criminal records problem and remedies are multifaceted, and we 
only measure the effects of one intervention (EBCLC’s record clearing  
services, including dismissals and felony reductions) on one set of outcomes 
(employment rates and earnings as reported to the Social Security  
Administration) in one jurisdiction (Alameda County, California).  While a 
full exploration of prescriptions is beyond the scope of this study, we sketch 
here some possible policy implications of our findings, including more record 
clearing services, earlier intervention and expanded and improved remedies.  
In recent years, advocates have been pressing for many of these reforms,205 
and our findings suggest that such reforms improve employment outcomes. 
First, given the apparent positive impact of the intervention on  
employment rates and earnings, state and local jurisdictions should increase 
the availability of record clearing services.  The current patchwork of record 
clearing programs is the product of innovative lawyers and programs, but is 
not systematic, and many people with records have nowhere to get help.  
Policymakers should strive to increase private, governmental, and  
 
204  See Ashenfelter, supra note 185, at 48. 
205 See VALLAS & DIETRICH, supra note 18, at 34–48.   
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philanthropic resources to expand and rationalize a record clearing delivery 
system. 
The federal government has taken modest steps to facilitate such a  
system. In 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice issued policy guidance to 
recipients of Second Chance Act funds allowing them to pay for record  
clearing and other legal services to help people with criminal records  
overcome barriers to employment.206  In 2014, AmeriCorps awarded a grant 
to the non-profit Equal Justice Works for the “Employment Opportunity  
Legal Corps.”207  The program supports approximately thirty-seven lawyers 
and 380 law students at placements in programs that assist people with  
criminal records in removing barriers to jobs.208 
Second, the earnings dip experienced by people with criminal records 
prior to unmarking means that earlier intervention could increase wages and 
reduce harm.  Record clearing assistance, for example, could be provided as 
a regular part of workforce development.209  The University of Maryland’s 
Reentry Clinic staffs bi-weekly expungement workshops at the federally 
funded American Jobs Center (One Stop) in Baltimore.  With sufficient  
resources and partnerships, such a model could be extended to many of the 
nation’s nearly 2,500 One Stops. 
Advocates have also pushed states to shorten the waiting time for record 
clearing, which can help people with records and reduce recidivism.210  In 
2015, New Jersey reduced the expungement waiting period for both 
 
206  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Office of Justice Programs, Policy: Allowable Uses for Second 
Chance Act Program Grant Funds (May 17, 2012). Such a use of funds continues to be 
permitted in 2017. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SECOND CHANCE ACT COMPREHENSIVE 
COMMUNITY-BASED ADULT REENTRY PROGRAM FY 2017 COMPETITIVE GRANT 
ANNOUNCEMENT 9 (2017), https://www.bja.gov/funding/communityreentry17.pdf. 
207  Elle Hogan, AmeriCorps Awards Equal Justice Works with Grant to Fund Employment 
Opportunity Legal Corps, EQUAL JUSTICE WORKS (May 7, 2014), 
http://www.equaljusticeworks.org/news/blog/EmploymentOpportunityLegalCorps. 
Participating legal aid organizations and Equal Justice Works will supplement the $1.4 million 
federal grant for a total budget of $2.5 million for three years. Karen Sloan, Program to Help 
Job-Seekers Expunge Criminal Records, NAT’L L.J. (May 6, 2014), 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202654226256/Program+To+Help+JobSeekers+Ex
punge+Criminal+Records%3Fmcode=1202617074964&curindex=1&curpage=ALL. 
208  E-mail from Anne Bloom, Dir. of Pub. Programs for Equal Justice Works, to Josh 
Epstein, law student at UC Berkeley School of Law (June 17, 2016) (on file with authors). In 
its first two years, the program reports lifting almost 30,000 barriers on behalf of more than 
10,000 people with criminal records. E-mail from Toya Lynch, Sen. Program Manager for 
Equal Justice Works, to Josh Epstein, law student at UC Berkeley School of Law (Oct. 18, 
2016) (on file with authors). 
209  CAREERONESTOP, https://www.careeronestop.org/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2016). 
210  Most recidivism occurs within three years of completing a sentence. See JACOBS, supra 
note 11, at 131 (explaining that people who have just completed a sentence are in immediate 
need of help). 
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misdemeanors and felonies though an “early pathway” option;211 in 2016, 
Missouri significantly reduced the waiting period for expungable felonies 
and misdemeanors.212  We do not know how many Clean Slate participants 
sought assistance as soon as they were legally eligible or if they waited for 
other reasons, but our findings suggest that earlier record clearing as a result 
of shorter waiting times could reduce the earnings dip. 
Third, our findings regarding both the benefits of the intervention and 
the harm of delay are consistent with a number of efforts to expand and  
improve record clearing remedies.  U.S. Senators Rand Paul and Corey 
Booker introduced the Record Expungement Designed to Enhance  
Employment Act to permit sealing of nonviolent convictions, which would 
create a record clearing remedy for federal offenses.213  States as diverse as 
Indiana, Louisiana, and Kentucky recently extended record clearing  
eligibility to people with certain felony convictions,214 and Maryland and 
Pennsylvania expanded their record sealing and expungement.215 
To increase the reach and benefits of unmarking, jurisdictions could  
permit automatic record clearing by operation of law.216  Connecticut permits 
erasure of records for all cases in which a person is found not guilty or the 
charge is dismissed, Arkansas presumptively expunges most misdemeanors 
absent a showing of clear and convincing evidence by the prosecutor, and 
New Jersey permits both automatic and immediate expungement of  
non-conviction records and immediate expungement after successful 
 
211  See 2015 N.J. Laws ch. 261 (reducing the wait from ten to five years for a felony and 
five to three years for a misdemeanor if a court finds expungement “is in the public interest, 
giving due consideration to the nature of the offense, and the applicant’s character and conduct 
since the conviction”). 
212  See MO. REV. STAT. § 640.140 (2011) (reducing the wait from twenty years to seven 
years following completion of a felony sentence, and from ten to three years following 
completion of a misdemeanor sentence, though limiting the number of lifetime expungements 
and the effect of expungement and permitting some employers and licensing agencies to 
consider expunged convictions). 
213  REDEEM Act, S. 2567, 113th Cong. (2014).  
214  IND. CODE § 35-38-9 (2015); H.R. 40, 16 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2016), 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 94; 
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 971 et seq. (2014). Unfortunately, some states still charge a 
high fee for record clearing—in Kentucky, the filing fee for an expungement motion is $500—
which undermines access to the remedy, especially for low-income people. See H.R. 40, 16 
Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2016), 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 94. 
215  S. 1005, 2016 Sess. (Md. 2016), 2016 Md. Laws ch. 515; S. 166, 2015 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 
2015), 2016 Pa. Laws 10, No. 5. States are also clarifying how cleared records are to be treated 
in the employment context, including non-disclosure on the part of the applicant and non-
discrimination on the part of the employer. See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 13–
17.  
216  European countries automatically seal most criminal records. JACOBS supra note 11, 
at 119. 
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completion of drug court.217  The most ambitious automatic sealing bills to 
date were introduced in Pennsylvania.218  Under the “Clean Slate” bills, both 
misdemeanor and felony convictions would be automatically sealed from 
public use after a set period of time and assuming no further convictions.219 
However, even as states take remedial measures on mass  
criminalization, they continue to add crimes and collateral consequences.220  
On the front end of the process, jurisdictions could reduce the creation of 
criminal records through a variety of strategies, including  
decriminalization.221  On the back end of the process, unmarking only works 
if courthouses, public repositories, and private background check companies 
maintain and share accurate records.222 
To regulate the use of criminal records by employers, state and local 
jurisdictions have adopted fair hiring measures such as ban-the-box and  
licensing reforms, and they have incentivized hiring of people with criminal 
 
217  CONN GEN. STAT. § 54-142a (1976); 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2011); H.R. 
1608, 2015 N.J. Laws ch. 261.  
218  See S. 1197, 2015 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2015); H.R. 1984, 2015 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2015). 
219  CMTY. LEGAL SERV. OF PHILA., Employment: “Clean Slate” Bills Introduced in 
Pennsylvania (Apr. 13, 2016), https://clsphila.org/news/clean-slate-bills-introduced-
pennsylvania. But see Love, supra note 102, at 1726 (arguing against forgetting remedies like 
expungement because they rewrite history, downplay concerns about public safety, ignore the 
reach of technology, and miss opportunities to reintegrate people with criminal records). 
220  See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 2 (explaining that in spite of efforts in 
some states to mitigate the collateral consequences associated with criminal records, new 
crimes and attendant collateral consequences continue to be added each year); Love, supra 
note 115 (arguing that the Vera Institute’s report provides an inaccurately optimistic picture 
of the landscape of state law collateral consequences and suffers from methodological flaws).  
221  To reduce the need for unmarking, states can decriminalize certain activities (like 
marijuana use), reclassify appropriate crimes (from felonies to misdemeanors and 
misdemeanors to infractions), and create alternatives to arrests (warning) and prosecution (like 
pretrial diversion). See JACOBS supra note 11, at 94–98 (describing these strategies); see also 
SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 21 (mentioning states that have built relief mechanisms 
into the “front-end” of the criminal justice process). 
222  Critics argue that the FBI database (compiled of state records) is inaccurate and that 
background check companies report mistaken information about people and their records, 
often in violation of consumer and privacy laws. See YU & DIETRICH, supra note 89, at 15 
(critiquing the accuracy of records provided by private background check companies); 
Roberts, supra note 5, at 344 (for a discussion of problems with the FBI database).  Congress 
has considered but failed to enact legislation to improve the accuracy of the FBI criminal 
database and criminal background checks. See Roberts, supra note 5, at 344 (discussing 
Congressional attempts to improve the accuracy of the FBI database, including references to 
the Fairness and Accuracy in Employment Background Checks Act and the Accurate 
Background Check Act, neither of which was enacted). Even records correctly cleared in 
public repositories may linger for use by background check companies in proprietary industry 
databases. See generally Sharon M. Dietrich, Preventing Background Screeners from 
Reporting Expunged Criminal Cases, SHRIVER CTR. (Apr. 2015); Jones, supra note 171, at 
255.  
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records through tax credits and negligent hiring mitigation for employers.223  
In general, reformers have proposed individualized screening that more 
closely ties the inquiry about a person’s criminal record to the relevant  
employment opportunity.224  As is evident from some of the recent studies of 
ban-the-box policies, much remains to be done to end racial discrimination 
in the employment setting beyond fair hiring initiatives and record clearing 
for people with criminal records.225 
C. RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
Our findings raise a number of unanswered questions.  These questions 
fall into several categories, including who benefits from the intervention, the 
durability of the program effects, the relevance of our findings in other legal 
settings and labor markets (including opportunities to study differences  
between jurisdictions), and other possible program effects.  All of these are 
ripe for further research. 
First, because of the aggregate nature of our data, we do not know within 
the sample if some people benefited more than others from the intervention.  
Does the nature of the underlying record matter?  Perhaps some kinds of 
cleared records are stickier than others in the context of employment  
outcomes.  Because discrimination by employers clearly still operates in the 
face of fair hiring policies, do the employment outcomes of unmarking vary 
by the race, gender, or other characteristics of program participants? 
Second, we do not yet know enough about the durability of the program 
 
223  SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 14, at 23 (describing how twenty-two states and the District 
of Columbia enacted such laws between 2009 and 2014). More than 150 local jurisdictions 
and twenty-nine states restrict the use of criminal records in the early stages of the hiring 
process.  AVERY & HERNANDEZ, supra note 15, at 1.  States have also begun heeding the call 
to ease licensing restrictions. Fact Sheet: New Steps to Reduce Unnecessary Occupation 
Licenses that are Limiting Worker Mobility and Reducing Wages, THE WHITE HOUSE (June 
17, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/17/fact-sheet-new-steps-
reduce-unnecessary-occupation-licenses-are-limiting. The Obama Administration issued a 
directive to all federal departments and agencies to ensure that “agencies with statutory 
authority to grant or deny occupation licenses . . . to revise their procedures to provide that 
such licenses are not denied presumptively by reason of an applicant’s criminal record.” 
Presidential Memorandum – Promoting Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Formerly 
Incarcerated Individuals, THE WHITE HOUSE, (Apr. 29, 2016), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/29/presidential-memorandum-
promoting-rehabilitation-and-reintegration. 
224  See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N, THE UNIFORM COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT (2010), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collateral_consequences/uccca_final_10.pdf 
(adopted by the American Bar Association in 2010 and designed to rationalize and clarify state 
policies and practices regarding collateral consequences).  
225  Supra notes 19 and 20 and accompanying text.  
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effects.  Will the average employment rates and earnings stay above baseline, 
rise further, or fade?  Perhaps employment rates and earnings reflect greater 
short-term motivation and heightened effort rather than improved labor  
market opportunities.  If more data and research determine that the effects of 
the intervention are ephemeral, what might be done to sustain earnings and 
employment in the medium to long term? 
Third, while we believe that EBCLC’s Clean Slate Clinic is generally 
representative of other record clearing programs, there are many other  
external variables to consider.  As noted above, local laws and practices vary 
widely in terms of record creation (enforcement, charging, and sentencing), 
record clearing (eligibility and granting), and record reporting (accuracy and 
availability).226  Labor market conditions and sorting vary by time and place, 
and employers in certain subsectors may be indifferent to an applicant’s  
criminal record.227  Any attempt to generalize findings about the effects of a 
local criminal record clearing program should be undertaken with caution. 
Fourth, the heterogeneity of local laws and practices actually presents 
opportunities for natural experiments regarding discrete policy choices and 
program outcomes.  For example, researchers could study program effects in 
states with different record clearing regimes to better understand the  
conditions under which remedies yield benefits.  We might also measure the 
relative effectiveness of state and federal job training grantees that include 
legal record clearing to achieve program goals.228 
Fifth, we did not study other possible benefits of the record clearing  
intervention.  For example, we would expect increased earnings to yield  
increased tax revenues.  In fact, neighboring jurisdictions might even  
compete to expand employment opportunities for residents with criminal  
records.229  Higher wages would presumably generate greater economic 
 
226  For an example in an analogous setting, see Alec C. Ewald, Rights Restoration and the 
Entanglement of U.S. Criminal and Civil Law: A Study of New York’s “Certificates of Relief,” 
41 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 5, 6 (2016) (arguing that differences in the ways that judges and 
probation officers award administrative “Certificates of Relief” in New York arise from local 
agreements, individual discretion, and legal ambiguity). 
227  For example, researchers have found that racial discrimination is more pronounced in 
service industry or “front of the house” jobs where employers are reluctant to hire African-
American men.  Devah Pager, Bruce Western & David Pedulla, Employment Discrimination 
and the Changing Landscape of Low-Wage Labor Markets, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 336 
(2009) (noting that employers may be “concerned about the soft skills of black men, or . . . 
relying on assumptions about what their customers or clients prefer”). Recent research 
suggests that participants who began but did not complete a record clearing process still 
benefited from improved employment outcomes in sectors of the economy where the existence 
of a record may be less impactful.  Loeffler et al., supra note 21, at 3. 
228  Thank you to Karen Lash for this suggestion.  
229  Thank you to Jenny Roberts for this insight. E-mail from Jenny Roberts, Professor of 
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activity in neighborhoods with record clearers, creating a multiplier effect 
that increases community wealth.  Because evidence suggests that  
employment opportunities for people with criminal records reduce  
recidivism,230 we would also expect a range of criminal justice-related cost 
savings.231 
Finally, and related to additional benefits, it is important to remember 
that record clearing programs typically have a number of goals, not all of 
which can be measured by employment rates and earnings.  In a companion 
qualitative study underway, preliminary data from surveys, focus groups, and 
in-depth interviews suggest that EBCLC’s Clean Slate Clinic clients place a 
high dignity value on clearing their criminal records.232  That is, the relative 
merit of such programs should be assessed more broadly than their impact on 
employment outcomes alone.  In fact, the status enhancement that comes with 
record clearing may be a critical element in providing people with criminal 
records the confidence or other positive attributes needed to be more  
successful in the job market. 
CONCLUSION 
Criminal records are ubiquitous and consequential for tens of millions 
of people, especially in the employment context where they limit  
opportunities and suppress earnings.  Addressing these negative  
consequences has become an important public policy goal.  Legal services 
 
Law, American Univ. Washington College of Law, to Jeffrey Selbin, Clinical Professor of 
Law, UC Berkeley School of Law (July 20, 2016) (on file with author).  
230  See Lahny Silva, Clean Slate: Expanding Expungements and Pardons for Non-Violent 
Federal Offenders, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 155, 162 (2011) (finding that within a group of people 
convicted of federal offenses, those who secured post release employment recidivated at a rate 
of 25% while those who did not recidivated at a rate of 50%); see generally Garima Siwach, 
37th Fall Research Conference Panel Paper, Criminal Background Checks and Recidivism: 
Evidence from Direct Access Care in New York State, ASS’N PUB. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 
(2015) (finding that being denied work at the New York Department of Health increased the 
likelihood of re-arrest within the next three years for applicants with criminal records). 
231  See, e.g., ECON. LEAGUE OF GREATER PHILA., ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF EMPLOYING 
FORMERLY INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS IN PHILADELPHIA, 8 (2011), http://economyleague. 
org/uploads/files/712279713790016867-economic-benefits-of-employing-formerly-
incarcerated-full-report.pdf (estimating the economic impact of hiring people with criminal 
records, including “avoided costs in the form of avoided spending on criminal justice agencies, 
social services, and government cash transfers, as well as prevented victim costs.”). 
232  Reiter et al., supra note 156. See also Ericka Adams et al., Erasing the Mark of a 
Criminal Past: Ex-Offenders’ Expectations and Experiences with Record Clearance, 19 
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 23, 27, 43 (2017) (finding that the process of record clearing facilitates 
cognitive transformation and the affirmation of a new identity); Ispa-Landa & Loeffler, supra 
note 97, at 406–09 (finding that stigma motivates people with criminal records to seek 
expungement remedies).  
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providers have developed record clearing programs as a mitigation strategy.  
Public defenders, civil legal aid offices, and law school clinics are assisting 
people with criminal records to seek legal remedies to dismiss or expunge 
records of past arrests and prosecutions.  During this period of growth and 
experimentation, and with so much at stake, it is important to know if, how, 
and for whom this unmarking intervention works. 
Our study sheds light on these questions.  With the limits and trade-offs 
involved in any research method, our findings suggest that the record clearing 
intervention delivers on its promise.  People with criminal records seek the 
unmarking remedy after a period of declining earnings, in spite of active  
labor market participation.  During or immediately after the intervention,  
average employment rates and earnings appear to rise, though the staying 
power of such increases is still unclear. 
This study cannot begin to answer all of the significant questions about 
effective record clearing interventions and policies.  Nevertheless, it provides 
initial baseline data that can inform unmarking policies and practices while 
identifying additional avenues and methods for research.  Over time, we hope 
this will assist communities and lawmakers to implement more targeted and 
effective strategies to help people with criminal records overcome barriers to 
employment and other opportunities. 
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APPENDICES 
A.  RESEARCH METHODS 
In any study of the effect of a program intervention on a participant, one 
can imagine two states of affairs.  In the first, a person eligible for the  
intervention participates in it.  In the second, the same individual does not 
participate in the intervention and is therefore not affected by it.  The impact 
of the intervention would be the difference between these two states of  
affairs. 
The impossibility of having the same person both participate and not 
participate in an intervention is often referred to as the Fundamental Problem 
of Causal Inference, with the problem being that further assumptions are 
needed to evaluate the causal effect of any program.233  This generic 
evaluation problem can be thought of as a problem of “internal validity.”  A 
research design is internally valid for estimating the effect of a program if it 
provides an unbiased estimate of the effect of the program for those who  
participated in it.234 
An altogether different evaluation challenge pertains to the “external  
validity” of the study.  The problem of external validity is that even an  
internally valid research design can fail to deliver an unbiased estimate of the 
measurement of interest because the effect of the program differs across  
populations and the study population was not the population of interest.  This 
is a kind of selection effect, and it may confound our ability to measure the 
treatment effect. 
For instance, in the context of EBCLC’s Clean Slate Clinic, one could 
imagine that those who sought assistance were more proactive and ambitious 
than other eligible people who did not seek assistance.  It might be that these 
qualities are associated with particularly pronounced effects of the program 
intervention.  Thus, any study regarding the impact of an intervention must 
wrestle with two serious evaluation challenges: (1) the internal validity  
counterfactual question: “What would have happened if the individuals who 
sought out the intervention had not done so?” and (2) the external validity 
extrapolation question: “Is the study population the population of interest?” 
 
233  This notion of a program effect on an outcome has a complicated and contested 
intellectual history.  The “two states of affairs” idea, discussed above, originates with Jerzy 
Neyman, but the notion and some related ideas are often referred to as the Rubin Causal Model. 
See generally Guido W. Imbens, Nonparametric Estimation of Average Treatment Effects 
Under Exogeneity: A Review, 86 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 4 (2004) (for citations to the early 
literature); see also Jeffrey Smith, A Critical Survey of Empirical Methods for Evaluating 
Active Labor Market Policies, 136 SWISS J. ECON. & STAT. 247, 248 (2000).  
234  There may also be contexts where internal validity pertains to the ability to obtain an 
unbiased estimate of a related population or sub-population, but we do not cover that case here. 
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Researchers have experimented with different methods in an effort to 
solve or minimize these problems, particularly that of internal validity.  Each 
of the approaches discussed below uses a different way to develop a  
comparison group that compellingly approximates the impossible  
counter-factual of what would have happened had intervention participants 
abstained from participation.  We describe these methods because they help 
to explain some of the strengths and limits of our study design. 
1. Randomized Controlled Trials 
The randomized controlled trial (“RCT”) is generally viewed as the 
ideal way to overcome the evaluation problems described above.  In an RCT, 
some fraction of people seeking participation in a program are randomly  
admitted or denied.235  Denied individuals then serve as a control group and 
their outcomes are compared with those of participants.236 
Randomization overcomes the concern that hidden characteristics (like 
social networks, tenacity, or gumption) are producing the outcome attributed 
to the intervention.  Although people in both the experimental and control 
groups have sought out the intervention (and therefore may have different 
dispositions from the larger pool of eligible participants), a randomized filter, 
like a coin toss, is not privy to these dispositional differences.  As a result, 
these hidden characteristics will be distributed roughly evenly between the 
experimental and control groups and their effect can be discounted, leaving 
the impact of the intervention. 
Despite the appeal of this model, it is not always effective or even  
available in practice.  People in the experimental group sometimes abandon 
the intervention before it is complete, and those in the control group might 
find a comparable intervention elsewhere.237  Further, implementing a  
randomized controlled trial means denying people access to a program or  
intervention that might help them.  Organizations like EBCLC’s Clean Slate 
Clinic strive not to turn away people eligible for services, making it hard to 
establish the classic control group.  Job training programs in the 1960s and 
 
235  In perhaps the most well-known RCT study of a civil legal aid intervention, researchers 
randomized an offer of assistance, not the intervention itself (to try to limit the selection effects 
of subsequent participation).  Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 199, at 2118. 
236  See id. for a robust defense of the use of RCTs in studying interventions in civil legal 
aid. But see Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study of 
Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101, 106–12 (2013) (for a critique describing the limits 
of RCTs in this setting).  
237  Raphael & Stoll, supra note 31, at 14; Selbin et al., Resource Allocation and Access to 
Justice, supra note 180, at 51–53 (describing these concerns with respect to the Greiner & 
Pattanayak RCT design in the unemployment insurance context). 
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70s were likewise unable to conduct randomized controlled trials.238 
Because randomization is often unavailable, researchers have found 
other ways to construct a meaningful comparison group, such as methods 
built around assumptions of “selection on observables” (econometric  
parlance) or “conditional independence” (statistical parlance).239  We discuss 
this type of approach next.  There are a large number of competing  
approaches in the field, but we focus on matching because it is emblematic 
of the general approach.240 
2. Matching 
Matching tries to solve the evaluation problem by linking each  
intervention participant with a non-participant doppelgänger.  For each 
program participant, the goal is to find a person from a pool of possible  
controls who is so similar that evaluating the individual’s outcomes is akin 
to evaluating what would have happened had the participant herself not  
participated.  This amounts to assuming that—within narrow groups defined 
based on available characteristics—there is randomization into treatment and 
control units.241 
Matching is based on those characteristics observable to the researcher 
(such as age, gender, ethnicity, zip code, or perhaps socioeconomic status).  
Even assuming that the researcher has access to the relevant set of  
observables, the method for selecting which match from among many  
candidates is complicated.  Any time there is more than a single  
characteristic, there is no unique definition of “close” and thus a variety of 
choices can be justified.  Moreover, there is often vigorous disagreement  
regarding which variables are to be matched on.242 
Debate about the efficacy of matching has taken up the more general 
challenge to “selection on observables” approaches posed in a famous article 
by Robert LaLonde.243  In that article, LaLonde compares the results of an 
 
238  See Ashenfelter, supra note 185, at 48.  
239  See Imbens, supra note 233, at 4.  
240  See generally Matias Busso et al., New Evidence on the Finite Sample Properties of 
Propensity Score Reweighting and Matching Estimators, 96 REV. ECON. & STAT. 885 (2014) 
(reviewing many of these approaches, with a focus on their finite sample performance). 
241  That membership in groups is based on observable characteristics gives rise to the 
“selection on observables” terminology. See Imbens, supra note 233, at 4. Program participants 
and controls are assumed to differ systematically only because of those variables observed by 
the researcher. 
242  See Raphael & Stoll, supra note 31, at 21 (labeling this the “problem of variable 
selection”). 
243  See Robert J. LaLonde, Evaluating the Econometric Evaluations of Training Programs 
with Experimental Data, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 604, 617–18 (1986).  
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RCT that measured the impact on earnings of an employment training  
program with those of many different econometric techniques, all of which 
invoke “selection on observables” (matching).  LaLonde shows that the  
training effect estimated by these models is sensitive to the composition of 
the comparison group as well as to the variables used in adjusting for  
differences between the treatment and control group.244  This is especially 
problematic because absent the experimental results LaLonde used as a 
benchmark for evaluating the accuracy of different matching models, the  
researcher has no principled way of choosing between the models.  To get 
things right would require either good luck or advanced knowledge of the 
intervention’s impact, the unavailability of which motivates estimation in the 
first place. 
More recent arguments hinge on whether updates to “selection on  
observables” techniques can be used to replicate the findings of an RCT (e.g., 
propensity matching, which matches people in the treatment and comparison 
groups based on their estimated probability of participating in the relevant 
program, given their observables).  Despite an exceedingly lengthy  
discussion in the academic literature, there is not yet consensus on a valid 
substitute for experimental methods, giving rise to the notion of “the 
LaLonde critique.”245 
Even after these theoretical challenges to the matching model have been 
set aside, researchers can still face practical problems.  Much of the debate 
initiated by LaLonde concerns the problem of having to choose between  
different ways of matching study participants.  Yet this is irrelevant if the 
data used to select a match is not detailed enough to enable a good match in 
the first place.  In LaLonde’s context, comparison groups were selected from 
population surveys like the Current Population Survey and the Continuous 
Work History Sample, both of which are random samples.246  Pulling a  
comparison group out of a population survey was easier in the context of job 
 
244  Id. at 614. 
245  See Rajeev H. Dehejia & Sadek Wahba, Causal Effects in Nonexperimental Studies: 
Reevaluating the Evaluation of Training Programs, 94 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 1053 (1999) 
(arguing that the estimates of the training program’s impact produced by propensity matching 
are comparable to the experimental benchmark estimate); see also Donald B. Rubin & Neal 
Thomas, Combining Propensity Score Matching with Additional Adjustments for Prognostic 
Covariates, 95 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 573 (2000) (for a more recent defense of propensity score 
matching).  But see James Heckman et al., Sources of Selection Bias in Evaluating Social 
Programs: An Interpretation of Conventional Measures and Evidence on the Effectiveness of 
Matching as a Program Evaluation Method, 93 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 13416 (1996) 
(finding that propensity matching eliminates some but not all of the selection bias, which 
distorts the estimated impact of the studied intervention). 
246  See Ashenfelter, supra note 185, at 48 (on the Continuous Work History Sample); see 
also LaLonde, supra note 243, at 611 (on the Current Population Survey).  
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training programs because so many people have experienced a spell of  
unemployment at some point in their lives and this fact facilitates matching 
based on income trajectory. 
The criminal records context is more challenging than the canonical job 
training example.  Although tens of millions of adults have criminal records, 
the subset of adults who could avail themselves of a record clearing remedy 
is often hard to ascertain, because few surveys ask questions regarding a 
criminal record.  This makes it all the more difficult to find in a standard 
population survey an appropriate comparison group from the participant’s 
local economic environment.247 
Assuming the researcher can find an appropriate comparison group, the 
potential for inconsistency in the measurement of outcomes poses an even 
thornier problem.  For instance, in our study, we obtained participants’  
earnings data from the Social Security Administration.  This approach to 
measurement was only possible because we had their social security numbers 
(“SSN”) and dates of birth.  We do not know the SSNs of non-participants, 
and in most contexts, a researcher would be in a like position.  If participants 
in our study had been matched using a population survey, we would have had 
to use the survey-reported earnings of the comparison group due to the  
unavailability of SSNs.  And if survey-reported earnings and the Social  
Security Administration’s earnings data differ from one another, estimated 
differences between participants and the comparison group might reflect less 
the role of the intervention of interest and more the way earnings were  
measured. 
B.  EARLY-VERSUS-LATE ADOPTERS HYPOTHESIS AND MODELLING 
To develop intuition regarding our early-versus-late adopters approach, 
first consider two hypothetical scenarios in which the record clearing  
intervention might affect earnings.  In the first scenario, having participated 
in the program allows a person access to a job they might not otherwise have 
been able to access.  In this scenario, participation leads to a permanent  
increase in earnings (we assume the person retains the job for which they are 
newly eligible).  People signing up earlier receive an earnings bump earlier. 
This first scenario is depicted graphically in Appendix Figure 1.  We 
describe the study sample in more detail later, but our four cohorts of program 
participants were “treated” (served by EBCLC’s Clean Slate Clinic) in the 
2nd half of 2007 (Cohort 1), the first half of 2008 (Cohort 2), the second half 
of 2008 (Cohort 3) and the first half of 2009 (Cohort 4), respectively.  In 
 
247  See Raphael & Stoll, supra note 31, at 382 (describing the difficulty of finding a 
comparison group in population surveys). 
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Appendix Figure 1, the earnings bump for Cohort 1 is labeled ABC. 
 
We assume that the earnings bump phases in halfway in 2007 because 
people in this cohort were not treated until halfway through the year.  For 
graphical purposes, we have also assumed that each successive cohort has 
earnings $100 above that of the cohort preceding them.  This has nothing to 
do with the record clearing intervention; it is simply an assumption that the 
different cohorts might have time-invariant differences reflecting a  
compendium of factors unrelated to the program of interest, and it allows for 
a clearer picture of the relative trajectories of each cohort. 
Turning to Cohort 2, the earnings bump is depicted in Appendix Figure 
1 with the label “DE.”  Earnings for this cohort adjust in a more punctuated 
way than for Cohort 1—rising in one year rather than in two—because the 
timing of treatment aligns with the onset of the calendar year.  Cohorts 3 and 
4 are analogous to Cohorts 1 and 2, but their earnings bumps are shifted  
forward by one calendar year on the x-axis.  To maintain a focus on ideas, 
we have assumed there is no statistical “noise” associated with any of the 
estimates. 
The second scenario is depicted graphically in Appendix Figure 2. Here, 
the record clearing intervention hypothetically boosts earnings only  
temporarily (i.e., only during participation in the actual program).  In the  
figure, the earnings bump for Cohort 1 is labeled ABC again.  Rather than 
being a bump that is consistent with long-run earnings improvement, here, 
the bump is ephemeral, fading after the half-year in the program.  This might 
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be consistent with the notion that earnings respond less to the labor market 
opportunities participants might be able to avail themselves of, and more to 
the immediate fact of counseling and the enthusiasm of a presumptive peak 
in personal organization and efficacy.  The earnings bumps for Cohorts 2, 3, 
and 4, labeled “DEF,” “GHI,” and “JKL,” respectively, are similarly  
ephemeral.  Cohorts 2 and 3 experience the bump in the same year because 
both are treated for a portion of 2008 (the first and second half of the year, 
respectively). 
 
 
Both of these scenarios assume that program participants seeking  
assistance at different dates are ex ante similar to one another (the $100  
differential between cohorts in Appendix Figure 1 was for graphical  
purposes).  There is, however, a long line of research in job training programs 
that indicates individuals self-select into seeking assistance based on their 
earnings or employment trajectories.  In particular, a well-known empirical 
pattern is for individuals to be more likely to avail themselves of training 
programs in the years subsequent to a “dip” in their earnings.  This pattern is 
often referred to as the “Ashenfelter dip” after Orley Ashenfelter, a leading 
author in the early literature on the effect of job trainings programs on the 
earnings of program participants.248 
 
248  See Ashenfelter, supra note 185, at 55 (observing the pre-job training dip in earnings 
for the first time); Orley Ashenfelter & David Card, Using the Longitudinal Structure of 
Earnings to Estimate the Effect of Training Programs, 67 REV. OF ECON. & STATS. 648, 650 
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To appreciate what the Ashenfelter dip might look like, Appendix  
Figure 3 depicts earnings for each cohort over time.  In the figure, we have 
assumed that program participants experience a decline in earnings prior to 
availing themselves of the Clean Slate intervention.  We have also assumed 
that the earnings decline does not continue after the program begins. 
 
 
The pattern depicted in Appendix Figure 3 could arise through two quite 
distinct (if related) causal mechanisms.  Under the first mechanism, the  
program might itself stem the earnings slide in a causal way (e.g., preserving 
employment options in an increasingly challenging economy).  Under the 
second mechanism, program participation is just a marker of other life 
choices.  A participant confronting an earnings slide (e.g., due to decreases 
in hours available from an employer or job loss) might take that reality as a 
“wake-up call” and engage in several life changes at the same time.  For  
example, a person might seek help from her friends or a local church at the 
same time as she is availing herself of record clearing services. 
 
(1985) (confirming the dip in the context of another job training program); Laurie J. Bassi, 
Estimating the Effect of Training Programs with Non-Random Selection, 66 REV. OF ECON. & 
STAT. 36, 43 (1984); James J. Heckman et al., The Economics and Econometrics of Active 
Labor Market Participants, 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECON. 1865, 1892–93 (1999) (showing 
the dip in a variety of training programs from around the world);  
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C.  OTHER FIGURES 
Appendix Figures 4 and 5 display raw aggregate data from the SSA. 
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D.  REGRESSION MODEL AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this appendix, we discuss in greater detail the regression model we 
used in the study.  We also consider what such modelling might look with 
alternative data sources, particularly microdata on individual labor market 
outcomes for those obtaining treatment and those not obtaining treatment.  
With the data available in our study, we used the following equation: 
 
Equation 1 
 𝑌"# = 𝜇" + 𝜆# + 𝜃)𝐷"#)+),-. + 𝜀"#  
 
In Equation 1, the Roman letters 𝑌"# and each of the 𝐷"#)  represent data, 
whereas the Greek letters 𝜇", 𝜆# and each of the 𝜃) represent parameters to be 
estimated.249  The remaining term 𝜀"# is a residual term that indicates the  
anticipated lack of a perfect fit of the regression model.  The dependent  
variable 𝑌"# is a labor market outcome for cohort c in year t and is taken to 
be either average real earnings for a cohort in a year, or the employment to 
population ratio for a cohort in a year.  The covariates 𝐷"#)  are indicators, 
sometimes also referred to as dummy variables, which are either zero or one, 
with one “indicating” a particular state.  Here, the particular state being  
indicated is that for cohort c, the year t is j years after Clean Slate treatment.  
For example, 𝐷"#0  is zero unless it is the year in which the given cohort is 
receiving Clean Slate treatment; 𝐷"#1  is zero unless it is one year after  
treatment; and 𝐷"#-1 is zero unless it is the year before treatment.  Intuitively, 
one can think of these covariates as leads and lags of treatment indicators. 
The parameters of interest in this model are the 𝜃), which correspond to 
estimated program effects.  For example, suppose the outcome were average 
real earnings.  Then 𝜃0 estimates the difference in average real earnings  
between the year of Clean Slate treatment and in the baseline years; 𝜃1  
estimates the difference in average real earnings between the year after Clean 
Slate treatment and in the baseline years; and 𝜃-1 estimates the difference in 
average real earnings between the year before Clean Slate treatment and in 
the baseline years. 
This then raises the question: what are the baseline years?  Baseline 
years are all years that fall outside the period five years before treatment to 
three years after treatment.  Intuitively, one can think of the baseline as 
corresponding to average earnings several years before Clean Slate  
 
249  In the display, the summation symbol ∑ is a shorthand way of writing 𝜃-.𝐷"#-. +	  𝜃-4𝐷"#-4+. 	  . 	  . +	  𝜃+𝐷"#+  without having to write out all the terms indicated by the ellipsis. 
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treatment.250  The program effects prior to treatment can be thought of as 
estimating selection effects, while those subsequent to treatment can be 
thought of as estimating an admixture of selection and program effects.  For 
example, suppose that individuals chose randomly when to seek Clean Slate 
services.  Then the time path of earnings would fail to predict the year in 
which an individual receives treatment, and the leads would be expected to 
be statistically indistinct from zero. 
A final question is how to choose the endpoints of the leads and lags, 
which here we have taken to be -5 and 3.  The choice of endpoints reflects 
competing considerations.  On the one hand, the wider the window used to 
estimate program effects, the more informative the estimates might be  
regarding the path of earnings leading up to and subsequent to program  
participation.  On the other hand, the wider that window, the fewer  
observations are represented in the baseline, and this may lead to more noise 
and possibly an estimate that is less robust to the exclusion of specific data 
points.  Another aspect of choosing the endpoints is that because treatment 
occurs between 2007 and 2009, and we have data from 2000 to 2011, we can 
effectively estimate more leads than we can lags.  If we have data through 
2014, for example, then we might well have chosen a right-hand endpoint of 
5 or 6 rather than 3.251 
Future research seeking to advance our knowledge of the effects of  
record clearing interventions might focus on alternative data sources and  
alternative research designs.  Regarding alternative data sources, ideally  
microdata on individual labor market outcomes would be available, both for 
those obtaining treatment as well as those not obtaining treatment.  Regarding 
alternative research designs, the gold standard for understanding program  
impacts remains random assignment, but there are different ways of  
implementing random assignment, and there are also close cousins of random 
assignment that may be more consistent with the goals of program  
administrators.  If microdata on individual outcomes could be combined with 
random assignment, a great deal could be learned about the labor market  
impacts of these programs.252 
 
250  The baseline is 2000–2001 and 2011 for Cohort 1, 2000–2002 for Cohorts 2 and 3, and 
2000–2003 for Cohort 4. 
251  We hope to receive additional SSA employment rate and earnings data for our cohorts, 
which would allow us to modify the right-hand endpoint accordingly. 
252  For the sake of concreteness, we refer to “earnings” instead of “labor market outcomes” 
but the discussion here is intended to be methodological in nature and thus pertains to any 
outcome that could be collected. In principle, that could also involve survey data on labor 
market outcomes, or even on outcomes that are not directly about labor market success but are 
valuable in and of themselves (e.g., on self-reported dignity). We anticipate that cost reasons 
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Suppose first that earnings are only available for those involved in the 
program.  As discussed above, this will typically be the case in any context 
involving administrative data, for the simple reason that program  
administrators possess identifying information for participants, but may not 
for non-participants.  To appreciate the value of data on individuals rather 
than on cohort, consider the role of “cohort indicators” in Equation 1—that 
is, the 𝜇" parameters.  Cohort indicators are intended to capture time invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity across cohorts c.  This plays a more minor role in 
estimation, but a potentially major role in inference. 
This is a general conclusion and is not specific to our data or sample, 
however, for the sake of concreteness, consider the regression results  
undergirding Figure 3.  One can estimate the 𝜃) parameters with or without 
cohort indicators; this is simply estimating two alternative multivariate  
regressions.  The estimated 𝜃) parameters obtained these two ways are highly 
similar to one another: viewing the 9 estimated 𝜃) parameters as data, they 
have a correlation coefficient over 0.99.  However, the regression with the 
cohort indicators included shows much better fit overall (e.g., an R-squared 
of 0.89 as opposed to 0.46 without the cohort indicators) and this can greatly 
improve the precision of the estimated effects. 
To summarize, if information on individual earnings is available, but 
only for program participants, precision of the estimates is likely to improve 
if the researcher has access to individual-level data, rather than cohort-level 
data.  Had we possessed data on individual earnings on participants only, we 
would have estimated a minor variation on Equation 1: 
 
Equation 2 
 𝑌6# = 𝜇6 + 𝜆# + 𝜃)𝐷"#)+),-. + 𝜀6#  
Here, individuals are indexed by i.  This would have involved a data set 
with n=2,820 observations rather than n=48, and would have involved  
estimating 234 𝜇6 parameters using an unweighted regression rather than  
estimating 3 𝜇" parameters using a regression with cohort weights.253  Despite 
 
will prevent most researchers from being able to survey participants and that administrative 
data will be the basis for measuring labor market outcomes. 
253  For technical reasons, the number of parameters to be estimated is one less than the 
number of individuals or cohorts. The contrast between these regressions also clarifies an old 
rule of regressions—the R-square is only sometimes valuable as a measure of goodness of fit. 
The R-square from the cohort-level regression is inflated by virtue of the fact that the 
individual-level variation is “hidden” from the regression by the aggregation to cohort-level 
data. 
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these superficial differences, the core notions of identification in these two 
approaches are similar, and the estimates are likely to be similar. 
Suppose next that earnings are available for participants as well as non-
participants.  The extent to which that additional information is valuable 
hinges on the extent to which non-participants’ earnings approximate  
participants’ earnings had they not obtained treatment.  In terms of  
observational statements (as opposed to statements regarding hypothetical 
scenarios), non-participants are more likely to be valuable to the researcher 
when their background characteristics and, more critically, the path of their 
earnings leading up to treatment, are more similar.254 
Sometimes non-participants are drawn from people who initiate contact 
with program administrators and fail to follow through with treatment.  Such 
a group is presumably not as similar to participants as if treatment was  
randomized, but is likely to be an improvement on a comparison group drawn 
randomly from the local labor market.  Recall that in our first example, with 
data on only participants, the value of individual data was primarily about 
improved precision.  Here, access to a comparison group would likely have 
an important effect on three different things: precision, robustness, and  
identification. 
Precision would improve in this example for two different reasons.  As 
before, the ability to estimate individual effects rather than cohort effects is 
likely to improve precision.  In addition, however, there is likely to be a  
substantial gain in the precision of the estimated year effects, or the 𝜆#  
parameters in Equations 1 or 2.  This is important because in using an early-
late adopter research design, the year effects tend to covary substantially with 
the estimated program effects.  This is a challenge for estimation, and  
improving the precision of the year effects spills over to improve the 
precision of the program effects. 
For the same reason, adding information on non-participants improves 
robustness.  The estimated year effects in a model estimated using data on 
only participants can be sensitive to a small number of data points.  If data 
on non-participants are available, the year effects are less fragile.  As before, 
this improved robustness in the estimated year effects spills over to improved 
robustness in the estimated program effects. 
 
254  See Imbens, supra note 233, at 7. The hypothetical statement given is the accurate one: 
the critical assumption is that non-participants’ earnings subsequent to treatment mimic what 
participants’ earnings would have been in the absence of treatment, or “counterfactual 
earnings.” Assuming that non-participants can be used to estimate counterfactual earnings 
becomes less plausible if background characteristics of non-participants are dissimilar to those 
of participants, or if earnings of non-participants prior to treatment exhibit different levels or 
trajectories than those of participants. 
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Finally, identification itself may be improved. By “identification,” we 
simply mean the ability to obtain an approximately unbiased estimate of the 
program effects.  Again, this depends on the similarity between the  
participants and the comparison non-participants.  
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